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WEAPONIZING THE OFFICE OF  
LEGAL COUNSEL 
EMILY BERMAN* 
Abstract: This Article argues that the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)—an office 
within the Justice Department that issues legal opinions that govern executive 
branch actors—arms the executive branch with a powerful weapon to deploy in 
its conflicts with Congress. Despite its reputation as a neutral arbiter of constitu-
tional questions, OLC’s separation-of-powers opinions do not simply describe 
the executive’s view of the law; they actually augment executive powers vis-à-vis 
Congress. This novel argument emerges from two descriptive claims laid out in 
this Article. The first is that OLC’s institutional design guarantees that its separa-
tion-of-powers opinions will articulate a decidedly pro-executive view of the law. 
The second is that these executive-friendly legal analyses not only guide the ac-
tions of executive officials, but also shape the legal landscape outside the execu-
tive branch. In other words, OLC makes its own legal reality: its separation-of-
powers opinions first envision a world that values executive branch prerogatives 
over congressional interests, and then, by their very existence, help realize that 
vision. The result is that OLC provides the executive with a powerful weapon in 
its inter-branch disputes with Congress—a phenomenon that to date has gone un-
remarked. After identifying the mechanisms through which OLC places a thumb 
on the executive’s side of the scale in inter-branch disputes, this Article suggests 
several ways that Congress could level the playing field. 
INTRODUCTION 
“We’re fighting all the subpoenas.”1 This statement encapsulates the 
Trump Administration’s approach to sharing information with Congress. De-
spite the legislative branch’s universally recognized oversight and impeach-
ment authority, executive branch officials have denied legislators’ access to 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2021, Emily Berman. All rights reserved. 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I would like to thank participants 
in Duke Law School’s Faculty Workshop (especially Walter Dellinger and Christopher Schroeder), 
the Loyola-Chicago Constitutional Law Colloquium, the Chicagoland Junior Scholars Workshop, the 
Ohio State Law School Summer Workshop Series, and the University of Houston Law Center’s 
Work-in-Progress Workshop, as well as David Fontana and Aziz Huq. 
 1 Charlie Savage, Trump Vows Stonewall of ‘All’ House Subpoenas, Setting Up Fight Over Pow-
ers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/us/politics/donald-trump-
subpoenas.html [https://perma.cc/J62K-BF7Y] (quoting President Donald Trump); see id. (“Mr. 
Trump has . . . abandon[ed] even the pretense of trying to negotiate accommodations and compromise 
. . . .”). 
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documents and testimony related to the inquiry into President Donald Trump’s 
relations with Ukraine, the President’s tax returns, portions of Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller’s report on Russian interference with the 2016 election, and 
more. Although President Trump’s efforts to rebuff congressional inquiries are 
the most recent—and most aggressive—examples of executive recalcitrance, 
they are by no means the first. Indeed, congressional-executive disputes over 
access to information are literally as old as the Constitution.2 Democratic and 
Republican administrations alike have chafed at Congress’s demands for in-
formation. Whether it was Eric Holder’s Justice Department’s efforts to deny 
congressional access to information regarding the investigation into gun-
running known as Operation Fast and Furious,3 the House Judiciary Commit-
tee’s thwarted efforts to acquire evidence regarding George W. Bush’s motiva-
tions for firing multiple United States Attorneys in 2007,4 or inter-branch 
wrangling in the course of the many investigations of Bill and Hillary Clinton,5 
conflicts over access to executive branch information form the backdrop of 
many political battles. Despite the many instances in which these and similar 
disputes have arisen in the past, they are rarely submitted to the courts, leaving 
the legal rules that apply—and thus the rights and obligations of the political 
branches to one another—unarticulated by a third-party arbiter such as the ju-
dicial branch and therefore uncertain.6 
Thanks to the Justice Department’s powerful Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC), however, the executive branch’s legal position on issues related to con-
gressional-executive information disputes is often quite certain and persuasive-
ly articulated. OLC, which provides legal advice that binds the executive 
branch unless overridden by the President or the Attorney General, has devel-
oped opinions offering legal analysis of many of the questions that touch on 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See generally LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 58 (2004) (reviewing the 
nature of disputes between the executive and legislative branches and how that comports with separa-
tion-of-powers concerns); MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRE-
CY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 37–43 (2d ed. 2002) (analyzing the history of executive privilege and its 
effect on presidential authority); Hist. of Refusals by Exec. Branch Offs. to Provide Info. Demanded 
by Cong., 6 Op. O.L.C. 751, 751 (1982) (detailing instances where executive branch officials declined 
to provide information requested by Congress). 
 3 See Josh Gerstein, Subpoena Fight Over Operation Fast and Furious Documents Finally Settled, 
POLITICO (May 9, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/09/fast-and-furious-documents-
holder-1313120 [https://perma.cc/3VPJ-L6Y8] (describing the battle and its resolution). 
 4 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Asserts Executive Privilege on Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/washington/29bush.html [https://perma.cc/9T67-S47F]. 
 5 See, e.g., Megan Carpentier, Travelgate to Furnituregate: A Guide to the Clinton Scandals of 
the 90s, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/27/hillary-
clinton-bill-clinton-scandals [https://perma.cc/9589-BVXU]. 
 6 See infra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. But see Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 
F.3d 755, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (rare example of congressional litigation to enforce subpoe-
nas). 
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executive information sharing with Congress.7 Existing commentary about 
OLC focuses on the extent to which it can effectively impose limits on presi-
dential power.8 Professor Bruce Ackerman’s answer to this question, for exam-
ple, is essentially “not at all.”9 Others come to OLC’s defense, asserting that 
Ackerman fails to acknowledge meaningful, law-based constraints that OLC 
imposes on White House policy decisions.10 Whatever the outcome of this de-
bate, however, everyone should agree that a critical structural constraint on 
presidential authority emanates from the separation of powers, yet there is little 
discussion of OLC’s impact on that structural check. 
As it turns out, this impact can be significant. This Article argues that 
OLC’s separation-of-powers opinions amplify executive power when it comes 
to its relations with Congress, providing the executive with a potent weapon to 
resist complying with congressional information requests. This novel argument 
emerges from two descriptive claims. The first is that there are significant—
and significantly underappreciated—implications that flow from the fact that 
OLC produces more than one type of written opinion.11 Opinions that arise out 
of OLC’s role “as, in effect, outside counsel” for executive branch agencies, 
resolve legal questions relating to executive agencies’ execution of the law.12 
These opinions assess issues such as the limits of an agency’s regulatory au-
thority, the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction, or legal disputes between agen-
cies.13 But there is another type of OLC opinion as well: those that opine on 
the separation of powers and, more specifically, the executive branch’s authori-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See infra Part II.A. 
 8 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); 
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRA-
TION (2007); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Law: Internal Legal Constraints on Execu-
tive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal 
Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpreta-
tion: A Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1306 (2000) (outlin-
ing the role of OLC). 
 9 See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 95–110 (arguing that OLC is fully politicized and has many 
institutional incentives to empower, rather than limit, the President); see also Eric Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Libyan Legal Limbo: Why There’s Nothing Wrong with Obama Ignoring Some of His Own 
Legal Advisers on Libya, SLATE (June 27, 2011), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2011/06/u-s-
intervention-in-libya-why-obama-doesn-t-need-the-approval-of-his-legal-advisers.html [https://perma.
cc/6ZET-RZTJ] (describing OLC as “Keeper of the Presidential Fig Leaf”—a source of legal justifi-
cation but not constraint). 
 10 See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1708–31 (2011) 
(reviewing ACKERMAN, supra note 8). 
 11 See infra notes 111–114 and accompanying text. 
 12 Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/olc [https://perma.cc/
WBA6-ND6G]. 
 13 See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text. 
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ty vis-à-vis Congress.14 A close analysis of OLC’s separation-of-powers opin-
ions demonstrates that, when it comes to questions of executive power, OLC’s 
reputation “for providing credible, authoritative, thorough and objective legal 
analysis,”15—rather than merely justifying executive branch policies—may not 
be fully warranted. Indeed, instead of simply calling balls and strikes, OLC’s 
separation-of-powers opinions articulate a decidedly pro-executive vision of 
the law. 
My second descriptive claim is that these pro-executive OLC opinions not 
only guide executive action, but actually confer a systemic advantage on the 
executive in its inter-branch information disputes with Congress—a phenome-
non that to date has gone unremarked.16 In other words, OLC makes its own 
legal reality. Its opinions first envision a world that values executive branch 
prerogatives over congressional interests, and then, by their very existence, 
help create a reality that reflects that vision. By foregrounding these systemic 
effects of OLC’s separation-of-powers opinions, this Article demonstrates that, 
in focusing solely on the intra-executive effects of OLC, existing debates 
about the Office overlook the significant effect that office’s work has on actors 
outside the executive branch and on the political landscape more generally. 
The pro-executive impact of these OLC opinions is a function of the na-
ture of inter-branch information-access disputes and the way they are resolved. 
Most congressional requests for information are satisfied without acrimony.17 
Disputes that do arise, however, historically have been resolved in the same 
way that other political conflicts are resolved—through negotiation and com-
promise.18 Just as a presidential veto threat can force Congress to rethink the 
contents of a bill, a presidential threat to assert executive privilege might cause 
a legislative committee to rethink the scope of its information request. Out-
comes are therefore dictated by a combination of each branch’s political capital 
and strength of political will. Those, in turn, are heavily influenced by public 
opinion.19 That same dynamic prevails when it comes to Congress’s ability to 
                                                                                                                           
 14 This point is closely akin to, though distinct from, Professor Bruce Ackerman’s analysis of 
OLC’s incentives when it is providing advice to the White House. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 
99–105 (arguing there are institutional incentives to justify the President’s desired policy). 
 15 Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Execu-
tive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 63 (2011), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdfs/vol124_forum_morrison.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY8Q-EWZE]. 
 16 See infra notes 85–234 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra Part I.B. 
 19 The operative “public opinion” for purposes of this Article is not merely the result of general 
public opinion polls. Rather, it is the product of complex interactions between the electorate and opin-
ion elites whose views help shape the broader political environment—such as elected officials, legal 
elites, non-governmental organizations, and the media. See Ari Adut, A Theory of the Public Sphere, 
30 SOCIO. THEORY 238, 241 (2012) (arguing that “civic discourse is produced by ambitious types in 
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secure information that the executive branch does not want to share. The 
branch that can most effectively spin the public narrative regarding a conflict 
in its favor will enjoy a decided advantage in negotiations. 
This Article’s central claim is that when the executive branch can point to 
an OLC opinion that supports its refusal to provide certain information to 
Congress—a memorandum about the scope of executive privilege or the en-
forceability of congressional subpoenas, for example—that memo provides the 
executive branch with an underappreciated structural advantage by bolstering 
its case in the court of public opinion. This advantage emerges through a num-
ber of different mechanisms. First, OLC opinions provide preexisting, clearly 
defined arguments that allow the President to frame the conflict’s narrative and 
ensure that he and his supporters advance a consistent, unified message.20 Sec-
ond, they publicly articulate executive-friendly assessments of both law and 
historical practice relevant to the dispute.21 Third, in doing so, they lower the 
political costs of refusing to comply with congressional requests by allowing 
the executive branch to portray its recalcitrance as both compliance with 
preexisting law and consistent with past practice.22 Thus, OLC memos lend a 
veneer of neutrality to the executive’s defenses against accusations of lawless-
ness. Fourth, they can discourage compromise. Always solicitous of executive 
branch prerogatives, executive officials often defend the legal principles em-
bodied in OLC memos, even if a particular President would rather concede the 
point—to limit the amount of time the conflict remains in the headlines, for 
example.23 Each of these effects places a thumb on the scale in favor of an ex-
ecutive seeking to resist congressional demands for information. 
To be sure, the magnitude of these effects and thus the advantage they 
confer on the executive will depend on many factors—how long OLC has ad-
hered to the position it advances in the memo, how consistently the executive 
has acted in accordance with that position, how effective the executive is in 
injecting the substance of the opinion into the public debate, the ability of OLC 
                                                                                                                           
front of nonparticipating audiences”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1006 (2008) (arguing that “the ‘public’ . . . is a stand-in for the complex pro-
cess by which the views of elites, interest groups, ordinary citizens, and others ultimately determine 
the de facto lines of political authority”); see also infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing 
how media, law, and history work to shape public opinion during inter-branch disputes). 
 20 See infra notes 124–148 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 149–195 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 196–223 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., to 
Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Att’y Gen. 2–3 (July 29, 1982) [hereinafter Olson Memorandum] (on 
file with author) (urging President H.W. Bush’s White House Counsel to refuse to comply with a 
congressional subpoena because it tends to weaken OLC’s position that the President’s close advisors 
enjoy immunity from testifying before Congress). 
2021] Weaponizing the Office of Legal Counsel 521 
to maintain its reputation as a source of accurate, impartial legal analysis,24 the 
preexisting political landscape, and sometimes the persuasiveness of the memo 
itself.25 Thus, my claim is not that the existence of an OLC opinion regarding a 
particular issue will be outcome determinative. There are times when, despite 
OLC’s view that the President is entitled to assert executive privilege over a 
document, Congress will succeed in securing that document nonetheless. Simi-
larly, there will be times when the executive will successfully bar Congress’s 
access to information even in the absence of a relevant OLC memo. 
President Trump’s success in withstanding congressional disclosure de-
mands—including requests made in the context of impeachment—is illustra-
tive. The unique political dynamics of the Trump presidency and the inelastici-
ty of the public view of his actions have frequently enabled him to categorical-
ly reject the traditional negotiation model for resolving inter-branch disputes, 
even in the absence of a relevant OLC opinion.26 At the same time, the admin-
istration has employed OLC opinions to legitimize its position on numerous 
occasions, and as in the past, opinions that have been on the books for years or 
even decades have been more successful in muting criticism than opinions 
drafted in the midst of an ongoing controversy.27 Moreover, even President 
Trump has at times bowed to pressure to disclose—notable examples being 
Congress’s successful acquisition of the whistleblower complaint that led to 
President Trump’s impeachment and the release of the readout of the Presi-
                                                                                                                           
 24 Some of the Trump Administration OLC’s work product has arguably already done damage to 
this reputation. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. The extent and longevity of that damage 
remains to be seen. 
 25 The absence or presence of divided government will obviously have immense implications for 
inter-branch disputes. Under unified government, any intra-branch information disputes that arise are 
likely to be addressed quietly under the radar. This Article’s argument, therefore, is almost exclusively 
relevant in times of divided government. That said, of the twenty-seventh congressional sessions since 
1969, there have been only seven during which the United States did not have a divided government. 
Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress and the White House in 1977–1981, 1993–1995, and 
2009–2011; Republicans controlled all three institutions from 2003–2007 and 2017–2019. 
 26 See Carl Hulse, Trump’s Stonewalling Takes Clash Between Branches to a New Level, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/politics/trump-white-house-democrats.
html [https://perma.cc/KGT2-D39Z].  
 27 See, e.g., Devlin Barrett & Matt Zapotosky, Justice Dept. Issues Memo Backing Mnuchin’s 
Refusal to Give Trump’s Tax Returns to Congress, WASH. POST (June 14, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-issues-memo-backing-mnuchins-refusal-to-
provide-trumps-tax-returns-to-congress/2019/06/14/3c8b3376-8ee7-11e9-b08e-cfd89bd36d4e_story.
html [https://perma.cc/H7Z9-MPED] (quoting a tweet by Representative Don Beyer describing OLC’s 
2019 opinion defending the Treasury Secretary’s refusal to provide the President’s tax returns to con-
gressional overseers as “OLC coming up with these flimsy, bogus excuses that won’t stand up in 
court”); infra notes 210–214 and accompanying text. President Trump also cites twenty-eight OLC 
opinions in the legal brief submitted in his 2020 Senate trial, eight of which came from his own Jus-
tice Department. See Charlotte Butash & Hilary Hurd, OLC on Presidential Power, According to 
Trump’s Impeachment Defense, LAWFARE (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/olc-
presidential-power-according-trumps-impeachment-defense [https://perma.cc/JQC6-S2WW].  
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dent’s phone call with the Ukrainian President.28 The argument here is not that 
OLC’s legal analysis can eliminate exogenous political dynamics. It is simply 
that OLC’s separation-of-powers opinions benefit the executive during inter-
branch disputes, that even the current administration has taken advantage of 
this effect, and that scholars have to date overlooked this phenomenon. 
My argument will proceed in three parts. Part I will begin with the legisla-
tive branch, laying out the nature of Congress’s oversight and investigative pow-
ers and then discussing the political economy of congressional-executive over-
sight conflicts.29 Part II will then turn to the executive branch.30 Section A briefly 
describes the role of OLC, with particular emphasis on how its location within 
the executive branch affects the substance of its separation-of-powers opinions.31 
Section B will then lay out the argument regarding these opinions’ systemic ef-
fects during inter-branch disputes.32 Part III will suggest reforms that could miti-
gate the advantage that OLC opinions provide the executive branch.33 
I. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 
All three branches of government recognize Congress’s authority to con-
duct oversight of the executive branch. Nevertheless, the executive and Con-
gress sometimes maintain conflicting views over where, exactly, the limits of 
Congress’s oversight and investigative powers lie. The vast majority of these 
disputes are quietly resolved without significant acrimony. But when efforts at 
compromise break down—or when one side is unwilling to seek compro-
mise—they can escalate into high-profile disputes that devolve into raw politi-
cal contests. This Part will first explain how Congress’s assertion of its investi-
gative powers can lead to conflict with the executive branch, and then describe 
how the branches resolve those conflicts.34 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Devlin Barrett et al., Whistleblower Claimed That Trump Abused His Office and That 




 29 See infra Part I. 
 30 See infra Part II. 
 31 See infra notes 85–119 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 120–234 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra Part III. 
 34 See infra notes 35–53 and accompanying text. 
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A. Congress’s Investigative Powers 
Congress has engaged in oversight investigations since the earliest days 
of the Republic.35 The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress’s investi-
gative authority is “inherent in the legislative process” and thus rooted in the 
Constitution,36 and that: “[i]t encompasses inquiries concerning the administra-
tion of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes”; “[i]t 
surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system”; and it “probes 
into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency 
or waste.”37 This investigative authority entails the right to issue and enforce 
subpoenas because “the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an 
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”38 Subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed, and the executive branch has 
acknowledged, this capacious conception of congressional investigative au-
thority and Congress’s powers to compel cooperation with its investigations.39 
The House of Representatives also holds the “sole Power of Impeachment,” 
which is another source of investigative authority.40 The conventional wisdom 
is that Congress’s investigative powers when conducting impeachment inquir-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See, e.g., Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98 
MARQ. L. REV. 881, 897 (2014) (“Congress asserted . . . a right [to conduct investigations] shortly 
after the adoption of the Constitution.” (quoting Scope of Cong. Oversight & Investigative Power with 
Respect to the Exec. Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60, 60 (1985))). 
 36 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); see also Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (“[A] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the 
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect . . . .”) 
(quoting McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927)). 
 37 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187; see also McGrain, 273 U.S. at 177–78 (1927) (explaining that Con-
gress’s investigative authority facilitates legislating and assessing whether executive branch agencies 
are performing their duties); Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Oversight of the Presidency, AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 1988, at 75, 81 (describing how Congress influences bu-
reaucratic behavior through “review[s], monitoring, and supervision of past or ongoing executive activi-
ty”); Wright, supra note 35, at 907 (expounding that Congress investigates for “prospective legislation, 
present execution of law, and government misconduct” as well as baser political purposes). 
 38 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174; see also id. at 175 (“[M]ere requests for information [that Congress 
needs] are often unavailing . . . .”). 
 39 See, e.g., Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (recognizing Congress’s 
right to the President’s personal information when it is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate 
task of the Congress” (quoting Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187)); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 
111 (1959) (“[Congress’s investigative power is] as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential pow-
er to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”); Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to a 
Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27, 30 (1981) (acknowledging Congress’s legitimate interest in obtain-
ing information to assist it in legislating as well as safeguarding against executive overreach or abuse). 
 40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
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ies exceed its powers in other oversight contexts, but whether and to what ex-
tent that is the case remains unsettled.41 
When conflicts over what executive branch information and whose testi-
mony Congress is entitled to secure arise,42 the legislative and executive 
branches traditionally negotiate resolutions that balance Congress’s investiga-
tive needs with the executive’s interest in non-disclosure.43 In fact, the courts 
have insisted that the obligation to seek mutual accommodation is constitu-
tionally mandated.44 Such accommodation can take many forms. Congress 
might, for example, agree to narrow the scope of its request, or the executive 
might agree to share information with a limited number of legislators, or in a 
secure facility.45 To cite a recent example, lawmakers originally insisted that 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See, e.g., Hist. of Refusals by Exec. Branch Offs. to Provide Info. Demanded by Cong., 6 Op. 
O.L.C. 751 769 (1982) (noting President Theodore Roosevelt’s position that “the only way the Senate 
could get [the documents it requested from him] was through his impeachment”). 
 42 Grounds for resisting disclosure include claims that the request exceeds the scope of congres-
sional authority. See, e.g., Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (stating that Congress may not investigate “solely 
for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to ‘punish’ those investigated”); Kilbourn v. 
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) (noting that “neither [the House nor the Senate] possesses the 
general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen”). Or, an individual resisting 
disclosure may argue that the information is subject to some form of executive privilege. See United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (stating that presidential communications are presumptively 
privileged); Access to Classified Info., 20 Op. O.L.C. 402, 402–05 (1996) (discussing executive con-
trol over national security information); Confidentiality of the Att’y Gen.’s Commc’ns in Counseling 
the President, 6 Op. O.L.C. 481, 483 (1982) (noting the Attorney General’s entitlement to a delibera-
tive process privilege). 
 43 See, e.g., Memorandum from Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., to the Heads of Exec. 
Dep’ts & Agencies on Procs. Governing Responses to Cong. Requests for Info. (Nov. 4, 1982), re-
printed in Hearing on the Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to Be Chief Justice of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 282 (1986) (noting that 
“good faith negotiations” between the branches historically “have minimized the need for invoking 
executive privilege” and instructing that conflicts between the branches should continue to rely on 
“this tradition of accommodation” for resolutions); Cong. Requests for Confidential Exec. Branch 
Info., 13 Op. O.L.C. 153, 161–62 (1989) (“[T]he executive branch agency and the committee staff 
will typically negotiate . . . to see if the dispute [over requested information] can be settled in a man-
ner acceptable to both sides. In most cases this accommodation process [succeeds] . . . .”); EMILY 
BERMAN, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A LEGISLATIVE REMEDY 12–13 (2009) (reviewing post-Watergate 
political resolutions to executive privilege disputes); FISHER, supra note 2, at 258 (discussing com-
mon strategies adopted by the executive branch and Congress in during inter-branch disputes); 
ROZELL, supra note 2 (documenting assertions of executive privilege in the twentieth century); Dawn 
Johnsen, Executive Privilege Since United States v. Nixon: Issues of Motivation and Accommodation, 
83 MINN. L. REV. 1127 (1999); Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Govern-
ment of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 479 
(1987). 
 44 See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that each branch 
has an “implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation 
of the needs of the conflicting branches” through a “spirit of dynamic compromise”). 
 45 E.g., Johnsen, supra note 43, at 1139 (“Typical accommodations include Congress substantial-
ly narrowing its initial request, or the executive branch briefing members of Congress on the subject 
matter of the requested documents, or the executive branch showing—but not relinquishing control 
 
2021] Weaponizing the Office of Legal Counsel 525 
all 535 members of Congress have access to the entire, unredacted report pre-
pared by Special Counsel Robert Mueller about Russian interference in the 
2016 election (the Mueller Report), as well as the investigative files underlying 
the report.46 When the Justice Department balked at this request, however, the 
investigating committees reached a deal with the Attorney General: a handful 
of lawmakers would have access to the information but would not be able to 
further disseminate what they learned.47 This compromise is a typical example 
of congressional-executive mutual accommodation. Beyond the very broad 
strokes regarding the nature of congressional authority and executive privilege 
laid out by the courts, no rules dictate what sort of information Congress may 
seek or what information the executive must provide, and no guidelines limit 
the types of compromises that can be made. Resolutions of these information 
disputes are contingent on many different factors and vary from case to case. 
When the parties cannot reach a compromise, negotiating tactics can take 
on a sharper edge. Congress might threaten to withhold appropriations,48 delay 
confirmation votes for executive appointees,49 or issue subpoenas to the execu-
tive branch.50 In response, the executive might make a formal assertion of ex-
ecutive privilege51 or testimonial immunity.52 Congress might respond by hold-
ing executive branch officials in contempt of Congress for failing to comply 
with a subpoena or even sue to have the subpoena enforced.53 It is to the dy-
namics of these more intractable disputes that I now turn. 
                                                                                                                           
of—the documents to particular members of Congress.”); Shane, supra note 43, at 515 (explaining 
that negotiations can include “the timing, form and conditions of disclosure”). 
 46 Kyle Cheney & Andrew Desiderio, These 3 Lawmakers Know the Secrets in Mueller’s Report, 
POLITICO (June 24, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/24/mueller-report-secrets-1376690 
[https://perma.cc/M2RN-P2EC]. 
 47 Id. (describing agreement between congressional committees and the Justice Department to 
provide legislators access to Mueller’s files “so long as the lawmakers promise to keep a tight lid on 
what they see”). 
 48 See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and Lev-
erage, 52 DUKE L.J. 323, 326 (2002). 
 49 See, e.g., id. at 336–39. 
 50 See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 108 (D.D.C. 2008) (allowing 
Congress to subpoena senior presidential aids for testimony); Fisher, supra note 48, at 339–47. 
 51 See generally Hist. of Refusals by Exec. Branch Offs. to Provide Info. Demanded by Cong., 6 
Op. O.L.C. 751, 751–52 (1982) (cataloging executive branch refusals to provide information to Con-
gress from the Washington Administration through the Reagan Administration). 
 52 See, e.g., Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Couns. to the President, 2019 WL 
2315338, at *1 (O.L.C. May 20, 2019) (discussing the invocation of testimonial immunity by presi-
dential advisors). 
 53 See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe & Sari Horwitz, Fast and Furious: Eric Holder Held in Contempt, 
WASH. POST (June 20, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fast-and-furious-eric-holder-
held-in-contempt/2012/06/20/gJQAaEUArV_story.html [https://perma.cc/W9U8-5677] (reporting that 
Congress held Attorney General Eric Holder in contempt); Philip Shabecoff, House Charges Head of 
E.P.A. with Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1982, at A1 (reporting that Congress held Environmental 
Protection Agency Administrator Anne Burford in contempt). 
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B. Congressional-Executive Information Disputes 
When the branches reach an impasse, there are two different fora that 
might serve as arbiter of the dispute: courts of law and the court of public opin-
ion. The federal courts traditionally play a minimal role for at least two rea-
sons. First, the courts are reluctant to become involved in inter-branch disputes 
and rarely will pronounce a definitive resolution.54 Second, the parties shy 
away from judicial resolutions, though perhaps for different reasons. The ex-
ecutive branch prefers to avoid judicial pronouncements that “establish fixed 
rights for further interactions,” preferring to maintain flexibility in both current 
and future negotiations with Congress.55 Congress, on the other hand, equates 
resorting to litigation with unacceptable delays.56 Moreover, both branches 
recognize that the existing system of negotiation allows for compromise that 
serves the institutional interest of each, whereas litigation is a zero-sum propo-
sition that only vindicates one branch’s interests.57 Of course, the courts remain 
a resolution of last resort for a Congress, and there are those who prefer more 
predictable outcomes for inter-branch conflicts—something a body of judicial 
precedent could provide.58 Indeed, it seems as if recourse to the courts has 
grown more common of late—after decades without such litigation, Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining to 
set an expedited briefing schedule in hopes that the parties might reach a resolution that renders the 
case moot, which they ultimately did); United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(holding that the congressional-executive information dispute was justiciable, but parties should return 
to the negotiating table); Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Mod-
est Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 131 (1996) (“For better or worse, the courts are 
extremely hesitant to play a leading role in defining executive-legislative relations.”). 
 55 Wright, supra note 35, at 921 (noting that the executive branch prefers negotiations to judicial 
decisions). 
 56 See, e.g., Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a 
Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Execu-
tive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71, 84 (1986) (“[E]ven with [expedited review], unac-
ceptable delays are inherent in the civil process.”); Devins, supra note 54, at 131 (“Congressional 
committees are not well served by time-consuming and often ineffective court proceedings.”); Rishika 
Dugyala, Schiff Says House Did Its Best to Get Trump Witnesses, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2020), https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/01/19/schiff-house-trump-witnesses-impeachment-100935 [https://
perma.cc/B3HR-ABGC] (quoting House Impeachment Manager Representative Adam Schiff arguing 
that if “the House needed to go through endless months or even years of litigation” to enforce subpoe-
nas, that would abrogate Congress’s oversight powers). 
 57 See Devins, supra note 54, at 132 (explaining that resorting to the courts creates a risk “that 
political negotiations would be replaced by contentious winner-take-all battles”); id. at 132–33 (citing 
officials in both the executive and legislative branches to the same effect). 
 58 See id. at 133 (citing former head of OLC Theodore Olson as opining that “a mechanism 
should be in place to allow principled, neutral mechanisms for dispute resolution”); Posner & Ver-
meule, supra note 19, at 993 (encouraging the branches to reject compromise when the benefits of 
clarifying a constitutional question outweigh the costs of the confrontation); Shane, supra note 43, at 
488 (arguing that both branches “should consider the applicable legal reference” and “regard legal 
justification as an important factor” in developing their negotiating stance). 
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has brought subpoena-enforcement actions in each of the last three administra-
tions.59 Should the Trump Administration’s categorical rejection of the ac-
commodation process become the norm, perhaps the courts will begin to play a 
more prominent role. 
On the other hand, the conventional view defends the accommodation 
process as an effective method of “balancing congressional need with execu-
tive branch interests.”60 Moreover, commentators from both sides of this nor-
mative divide agree that these conflicts are inherently political disputes that are 
nearly always resolved in the same way as any other political dispute.61 Con-
sequently, public opinion ultimately plays a significant role in determining 
their outcome.62 When a dispute over the scope of Congress’s authority or the 
reach of executive privilege arises, therefore, it is the people, rather than the 
courts, that serve as principal referee.63 The critical role of public opinion 
would come as no surprise to our Constitution’s Framers. It is axiomatic that 
the structural separation of powers was designed to prevent “a gradual concen-
tration of the several powers in the same department” by “giving to those who 
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Administration 
of President Trump); Miers, 542 F.3d at 909 (Administration of George W. Bush); Comm. on Over-
sight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013) (Administration of Barack 
Obama). 
 60 FISHER, supra note 2, at 258 (“Untidy as they are, political battles between Congress and the 
executive branch are generally effective in resolving executive privilege disputes.”); ROZELL, supra 
note 2, at 7 (“[D]isputes over the withholding of information can best be resolved by the political ebb 
and flow of the separation of powers system.”); Devins, supra note 54, at 110 (judicial involvement 
“risks more harm than good”); Johnsen, supra note 43, at 1139 (“The accommodation process effec-
tively takes account of the institutional, partisan and personal interests [of both branches] . . . .”); 
Wright, supra note 35, at 943; see also id. (favoring “a thoroughly political mechanism . . . for resolu-
tion of disputes between the political branches” because it “allow[s] political will and leverage to 
resolve inherently political disputes”). 
 61 See, e.g., Devins, supra note 54, at 126 (explaining that resolutions are “dependent on the skills 
of the negotiators and the political climate” as much as they are on the strengths of the parties’ legal 
arguments); Fisher, supra note 48, at 324 (arguing that in inter-branch disputes, “both branches are at 
the mercy of political developments that can . . . tilt the advantage decisively to one side”). 
 62 See, e.g., Adut, supra note 19, at 247–49 (describing public interpretation of alleged scandal as 
critical to political standing and describing the American presidency’s power as reliant on the “incum-
bents’ positive public image”); Scott J. Basinger & Brandon Rottinghaus, Stonewalling and Suspicion 
During Presidential Scandals, 65 POL. RSCH. Q. 290, 293 (2012) (“[C]ongressional investigations are 
sensitive to the media’s and the public’s initial and continuing interest in a scandal.”); Posner & Ver-
meule, supra note 19 (“[T]hrough the mysterious process by which public opinion forms, the public 
will throw its weight behind one branch or the other, and the branch that receives public support will 
prevail.”); Brandon Rottinghaus & Zlata Bereznikova, Exorcising Scandal in the White House: Presi-
dential Polling in Times of Crisis, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 493, 496–97 (2006) (noting that during 
scandal, Presidents calibrate their actions based on how concerned the public is about the issue). 
 63 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1046 (“The populace at large exercises an indirect 
influence over constitutional development, but as a filter that rules out certain elite positions and as an 
ultimate court of appeal . . . .”). 
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motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”64 But it is less commonly not-
ed that Federalist 51 describes the separation of powers as “auxiliary precau-
tions,” whereas “the primary control on the government” would be “[a] de-
pendence on the people” themselves.65 
It can be helpful to think of inter-branch information disputes as an itera-
tive game, where the playing field is constantly shifting under the participants’ 
feet while simultaneously being shifted by those participants.66 Public opinion 
formation, and the political power it engenders, is part of a feedback loop, 
where public figures are both guided by and seek to influence how current de-
bates and their response to them will be perceived.67 When these public figures 
act—publishing an op-ed, issuing a subpoena, offering a compromise solu-
tion—public opinion will take account of that action and either change, or not, 
in response. At each stage of this iterative “game,” each side must make pre-
dictive judgments regarding how subsequent rounds of the game are likely to 
play out. Legislators must determine whether to issue a request for information 
or a subpoena, or hold an executive official in contempt of Congress. Similar-
ly, the White House must decide whether to cooperate with or defy Congress. 
The calculations on both sides not only will consider preexisting levels of pub-
lic support and political capital, but also will try to anticipate how the other 
branch’s, the media’s, and the public’s response will shape the future political 
environment. Each move will result in a new equilibrium that will influence 
the next move that politicians or other stakeholders make, which will, in turn, 
affect public opinion, and so on. Thus, public opinion is not static but adjusts 
over time to incorporate these developments. 
The actual mechanisms through which public opinion regarding inter-
branch disputes develops and operates are complex and elusive.68 The species 
of “public opinion” that drives the outcome of congressional-executive infor-
mation is not simply general public opinion that may be measured through 
                                                                                                                           
 64 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 399 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864). 
 65 Id.; see also, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 915, 959 (2005) (noting that “[s]eparation of powers jurisprudence” has lost “sight of 
Madison’s accompanying reminder that structural competition between self-aggrandizing branches is 
only meant to be an ‘auxiliary precaution[]’” (alteration in original) (quoting id.); Adrian Vermeule, 
Precautionary Principles in Constitutional Law, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 181, 187 (2012) (identifying 
separation of powers as a precaution against abuse of power “auxiliary to elections”). 
 66 Basinger & Rottinghaus, supra note 62. 
 67 See George C. Edwards III & B. Dan Wood, Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, 
and the Media, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 327, 327 (1999) (noting the feedback loop between congres-
sional attention, media attention, and enhanced political power); Stephanie Greco Larson, The President 
and Congress in the Media, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. Sept. 1988, at 64, 71 (noting the inter-
relationship between politicians’ actions, media coverage, public attention, and elite responses). 
 68 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1045–46 (“Public constitutional sentiment evolves in 
subterranean fashion, generally unperceived by those who exercise power.”). 
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polls. Rather, the relevant public opinion is the general sentiment that results 
from the interplay of actions and reactions in the public sphere taken by legal 
and political elites, interest groups, and other influential individuals and insti-
tutions, such as editorial boards and cable news pundits.69 
Although public opinion formation is unpredictable, it is clear that both 
historical precedent and law play a major role in its formation.70 Arguments 
based on historical practice have force for at least two reasons. First, the Su-
preme Court itself treats historical precedent as legally relevant in inter-branch 
disputes.71 Second, such precedents affect public opinion in their own right. 
The public, like the Supreme Court, “generally give[s] weight to tradition and 
precedent,” and might view “the agent who resists the precedent” as the trans-
gressor.72 A legislator or executive official might dismiss as irrelevant the ex-
amples set by his predecessors (or even by himself), but if those examples 
have traction in the public mind as relevant precedent, there will be a political 
cost for departing from them.73 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Adut, supra note 19, at 240–41; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1000. 
 70 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 19; see Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1381, 1413 (2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UN-
BOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)) (“[A]n important feature of partisan politics 
going back to the 1790s is precisely the claim that the other side, including the President, is acting 
unlawfully or unconstitutionally; partisans would not invoke this argument and seek to manipulate 
popular perceptions about presidential legality if voters [did not care about it] . . . .” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
 71 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997) (considering not only judicial precedent but 
historical practice in the context of a separation of powers dispute); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (emphasizing that “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power,” but raises 
the presumption that a course of conduct is constitutional); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (acknowledging that although historical prac-
tice cannot displace the Constitution or legislation, it “give[s] meaning to the words of a text”); Curtis 
A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 411, 413 (2012) (highlighting the important role that past practice plays in resolving inter-branch 
disputes).  
 72 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1009. For example, Attorney General William Barr’s 
primary argument against acquiescing in a House Committee’s request that he submit during a hearing 
about the Mueller Report to questioning by the Committee’s staff attorneys—as opposed to its Mem-
bers—was that such a procedure was “unprecedented.” E.g., Olivia Beavers & Morgan Chalfant, 
Barr, Dems Fail to Reach Deal on House Testimony, THE HILL (May 1, 2019), https://thehill.com/
homenews/house/441698-second-day-of-barr-testimony-is-off [https://perma.cc/W7R4-S6AZ]. Judi-
ciary Committee Chairman Jerold Nadler responded in kind, arguing that “committee staff question-
ing has long been an important . . . aspect of congressional oversight that is in complete accordance 
with House rules and past precedent.” Susan Crabtree, Lawmakers Dispute Precedent for Holding 
Barr in Contempt, REALCLEARPOLITICS (May 3, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/
2019/05/03/lawmakers_dispute_precedent_for_holding_barr_in_contempt_140235.html [https://perma.
cc/FQ7N-4Q4F]. 
 73 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 999 (“The ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’ makes it 
positively costly for decision makers to disavow a principle they relied on to their benefit at an earlier 
time . . . .” (footnote omitted) (quoting JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND 341, 402 (1999))). 
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Legal arguments operate in similar fashion but play an even more signifi-
cant role because allegations of lawlessness are politically salient in the media, 
with the public, and with opinion elites.74 In fact, merely alleging unlawful 
conduct can transform a “debate” into a “controversy.”75 And “the political 
cost of pursuing an ultimately unpopular policy initiative . . . goes up with the 
perceived illegality of the initiative.”76 As a result, both the parties and the me-
dia often frame inter-branch battles in legal terms—meaning, whether Con-
gress has a “right” to a particular piece of information or whether the Presi-
dent’s invocation of executive privilege is legally valid.77 
Note that the fact that the parties may be acting contrary to law or history, 
and that they may know they are doing so is not necessarily salient. Rather, the 
important thing for the conflicting parties is to convey to their audience that 
they are acting in compliance with law or precedent.78 So the side that supplies 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, 
and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1138–39 (2013) (considering the effect of perceived 
illegality on already unpopular political stances and noting that the salience of legal arguments creates 
incentives for presidential opponents “to criticize executive actions in legal terms”); Pildes, supra note 
70, at 1409 (arguing that “law (and the perceptions of legality) is not hermetically sealed off from 
politics and public opinion” but rather “perceptions about lawful authority . . . are inextricably inter-
twined with political and public responses to presidential action”). 
 75 See Pildes, supra note 70, at 1412 (“[T]he allegation that the President has violated the law is 
often what transforms an event into a scandal.”). 
 76 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 74. 
 77 See, e.g., Rachael Bade et al., White House Blocks Former Trump Aide from Answering House 
Panel’s Questions, Angering Democrats, WASH. POST (June 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/powerpost/former-trump-aide-faces-questions-from-house-panel-about-russia-contacts-hush-
money-payments/2019/06/19/5f8b60da-9293-11e9-b570-6416efdc0803_story.html [https://perma.cc/
79WM-2ZZW] (describing one lawmaker’s reaction to OLC’s theory of absolute immunity as “based 
on this very bogus immunity, sort of newly invented, very broad immunity, that you can never be 
asked anything about anything you ever did while you worked for the president”); Mary Clare Jalo-
nick & Eric Tucker, House Democrats, White House Spar in Hope Hicks Interview, NBC N.Y. (June 
20, 2019), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/house-democrats-white-house-
spar-in-hope-hicks-interview/1538569/ [https://perma.cc/C63M-CA2E] (describing both President 
Trump’s objection to permitting former White House aides Don McGahn and Hope Hicks to testify 
before congressional investigators—that as presidential advisors they are “absolutely immune” from 
congressional process as a legal matter—and Congressman Jerold Nadler’s response—that “the immuni-
ty assertion is ‘absolute nonsense as a matter of law’”—as legal ones); John Wagner et al., White House 
Moves to Bar Counselor Kellyanne Conway from Testifying to Congress About Alleged Violations of 
Hatch Act, WASH. POST (June 24, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kellyanne-conway-
says-democrats-seeking-testimony-on-hatch-act-violations-are-retaliating-against-her-politically/2019/
06/24/9398d3ea-9689-11e9-830a-21b9b36b64ad_story.html [https://perma.cc/7MCW-U3PK] (refer-
encing the House Democrats’ argument that “the White House has no right to claim executive privi-
lege or immunity for [Kellyanne] Conway because the alleged violations deal with her personal ac-
tions—not her duties advising the president”). 
 78 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 74, at 1117 (“The relative perceived strength of a legal 
argument . . . might have a constraining effect.”). 
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the most convincing “performance of legality” will reap the benefits of the 
public’s desire to see public officials acting lawfully.79 
Congress and the President will therefore deploy law and precedent in an 
effort to shape political sentiment. Discussion of the means by which they do 
so takes center stage in the next Part, which will make the case that OLC 
memos award the executive branch an underappreciated structural advantage 
over Congress when it comes to information disputes.80 
II. INFORMATION CONFLICTS AND OLC SEPARATION-OF-POWERS OPINIONS 
This Part turns to the role that OLC memos play in the political tug-of-war 
described above. Section A discusses OLC’s role, highlighting the institutional 
forces that press its separation-of-powers opinions in a pro-executive direction.81 
Section B then turns to an analysis of the mechanisms through which OLC’s 
work product confers an advantage on the executive in inter-branch conflicts.82 
To be sure, the extent to which OLC memos have this effect is an empirical 
question. What follows does not purport to be a statistical study. Nevertheless, it 
paints a dramatic descriptive picture of the beneficial impact for the executive 
that OLC’s opinions have on the political landscape. 
My goal here is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the relative 
assets and liabilities that the political branches bring to their confrontations 
with one another. After all, OLC memos are not the only structural advantage 
over Congress that the executive branch enjoys,83 nor is Congress without its 
                                                                                                                           
 79 The legal argument perceived as most convincing will not necessarily win the day, if other 
political factors exert sufficient force. See Fisher, supra note 48, at 323 (“Efforts to resolve inter-
branch disputes on purely legal grounds may have to give ground in the face of superior political mus-
cle . . . .”); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies, in CONGRESS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 64, 71 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005) (providing an example 
where the deciding factor was “unanimous, bipartisan support on the committee” generated by the 
flagrant misconduct being investigated).  
 80 See infra notes 83–233 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 85–119 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 120–234 and accompanying text. 
 83 Such advantages include a preference for the status quo, the agenda-setting power of the 
bully pulpit, and the hierarchical structure of the executive branch. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, 
supra note 71, at 443 (“Presidents have both the will and the capacity to promote the power of 
their own institution . . . [whereas] individual legislators have neither . . . .”); George C. Edwards 
III, The President and Congress: The Inevitability of Conflict, 8 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 245, 250 
(1978) (noting that the executive branch has structural advantages over Congress because it is 
“hierarchically organized” whereas “Congress is highly decentralized, with each member jealous-
ly guarding his or her independence and power”); Kaiser, supra note 37, at 79 (noting the “pres-
tige and perquisites associated with the office of president; a nationwide electoral constituency 
and unequaled public visibility; and unparalleled ability to influence public opinion, to mobilize 
public support, and to set the policy agenda”). 
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own formidable tools to counteract these advantages.84 Rather, I seek to call 
attention to an additional structural advantage for the executive that has to date 
been missing from these lists: OLC opinions. 
A. The OLC as an Executive Branch Institution 
This Section will first describe the salient characteristics of OLC—
especially its influential role and its carefully cultivated reputation for inde-
pendence—and then explain why that independence is subject to question 
when it comes to separation-of-powers opinions. 
1. OLC’s Role as an Independent Arbiter of Legal Questions 
OLC is an office within the Department of Justice to which the Attorney 
General has delegated the authority to provide legal advice for the executive 
branch.85 Run by a presidentially appointed Assistant Attorney General and 
staffed by about two dozen non-political-appointee attorneys, OLC’s “core 
function . . . is to provide controlling advice to Executive Branch officials on 
questions of law that are centrally important to the functioning of the Federal 
Government.”86 This role makes OLC “the most important centralized source” 
for such legal advice.87 
                                                                                                                           
 84 These tools include making floor statements, introducing bills, holding oversight hearings, 
issuing contempt citations, initiating impeachment proceedings, withholding consent to presidential 
appointments and treaties, and strategic use of the appropriations power. See, e.g., Bradley & Morri-
son, supra note 71, at 446 (pointing to “oversight hearings, nonbinding resolutions, the threat of con-
tempt proceedings, and public disclosure of information” as “‘soft law’ tools” that Congress can em-
ploy against the executive branch); Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Mobilizing the Public 
Against the President: Congress and the Political Costs of Unilateral Action, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 769, 
783 (2017) (same); Fisher, supra note 48, at 325 (“Congress can win most of the time—if it has the 
will—because its political tools are formidable.”); see also Charles M. Cameron & B. Peter Rosen-
dorff, A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight, 5 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 44 (1993) (noting 
that holding hearings (and presumably contempt votes) can signal how committed Congress is to 
imposing its will on the executive). 
 85 See Moss, supra note 8, at 1308 (discussing OLC’s role). 
 86 Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., Dep’t 
of Justice, to Att’ys of the Off. of Legal Couns., Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written 
Opinions 1 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Barron Memorandum]; Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 12 
(noting that OLC is responsible for: providing legal advice regarding “legal issues of particular com-
plexity and importance or those about which two or more agencies are in disagreement”; “reviewing 
and commenting on the constitutionality of pending legislation” and executive orders; reviewing pro-
spective orders and regulations; and performing “a variety of special assignments referred by the At-
torney General or the Deputy Attorney General”); see also Morrison, supra note 10, at 1709 (identify-
ing OLC’s “core function [as providing] formal legal advice through written opinions”). 
 87 Morrison, supra note 10, at 1709. 
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Describing OLC’s output as “legal advice,” however—particularly when 
it takes the form of written memos—does not fully capture its significance.88 
The opinions that OLC supplies function more as the equivalent of binding 
judicial precedent than as traditional legal advice—they are the law of the ex-
ecutive branch “unless ‘overruled’ by the Attorney General or the President,” 
and they serve as binding precedent for OLC itself, which will depart from or 
overrule a previous opinion only rarely and for good reason.89 Moreover, OLC 
memos frequently address questions that will never be presented to an Article 
III court.90 This is particularly true when it comes to separation-of-powers 
questions, due to courts’ reluctance to rule on such questions.91 OLC’s view on 
certain issues will therefore be the only “legal opinion” ever produced. 
A signature aspect of OLC’s operations is its self-described mission to 
provide “candid, independent, and principled advice—even when that advice is 
inconsistent with the aims of policymakers.”92 Indeed, some of the earliest 
statements regarding the Attorney General’s role interpreting the law describe 
it as a “quasi-judicial” role.93 Former OLC attorneys stress this aspect of the 
Office’s work product, which is driven by prudential concerns.94 The value of 
the Office’s legal advice derives from its performance as—or its being per-
ceived to perform as—a neutral arbiter of the law, rather than as an advocate.95 
                                                                                                                           
 88 OLC’s advice is produced through formal memos, as well as oral and electronic communica-
tions. See id. at 1710. This Article is exclusively concerned with OLC’s function of producing written, 
public memos addressing separation-of-powers questions. 
 89 Id. at 1711; see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 74, at 1134 & n.130; Moss, supra note 8, 
at 1305 (“The legal advice of the Office . . . constitutes the legal position of the executive branch, 
unless overruled by the President or the Attorney General.”). Deviation from earlier precedent by 
subsequent OLC attorneys is atypical. Morrison, supra note 10, at 1714; see also Bradley & Morrison, 
supra note 74, at 1133 (“OLC has developed a range of practices and traditions—including a strong 
norm of adhering to its own precedents even across administrations . . . .”); Moss, supra note 8, at 
1325 (“[T]he executive branch lawyer . . . should not lightly cast aside [prior executive branch posi-
tions] . . . .”). 
 90 See Morrison, supra note 10, at 1693 (“Much of the work done by offices like OLC arises in 
these areas of judicial non- or underenforcement.” (citing The Const. Separation of Powers Between 
the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 180 (1996))). 
 91 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 35, at 890 (pointing out that “restraint is generally the hallmark of 
Article III tribunals presented with bickering political branches”). 
 92 Barron Memorandum, supra note 86. 
 93 See Moss, supra note 8, at 1309 (citing Off. & Duties of Att’y Gen., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 334 
(1854)). 
 94 See Dawn Johnsen, Toward Restoring Rule-of-Law Norms, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1205, 1212 (2019) 
(“OLC has a longstanding, nonpartisan tradition of giving accurate, untainted legal advice . . . .”); 
Morrison, supra note 15, at 63–65 (describing a “decades-long tradition[] of providing legal advice 
based on their best view of the law” and producing “credible, good-faith legal analysis”). 
 95 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 170; John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of 
the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon,15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
375, 424 (1993) (“[I]t is useful for the Office to cultivate a reputation of applying the law scrupulously 
without regard to political or policy interest.”); Morrison, supra note 10, at 1722, 1730 (arguing that 
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Much like the Supreme Court, perception of OLC as principled, independent, 
and insulated from partisan political forces lends it legitimacy and, as a result, 
increases its power.96 Should OLC’s opinions cease to enjoy this positive repu-
tation, their value would suffer, and client agencies might be less likely seek 
out the Office’s advice.97 To remain relevant and to retain its power as execu-
tive branch lawmaker, OLC thus relies upon its reputation as a straight shooter. 
OLC has “a range of practices” and “[d]eeply rooted traditions” that help 
perpetuate this reputation.98 The “‘cultural norms’ of the office—norms that 
prize independence and professional integrity”—are one mechanism.99 There 
are also concrete policies designed to serve this goal. As an initial matter, OLC 
                                                                                                                           
OLC “has real, practical incentives to honor [its] norms” of “independence and professional integri-
ty,” in part because “the general belief that OLC honors these norms—give[s] credibility to OLC’s 
legal analysis”); Moss, supra note 8, at 1311 (“[T]he legal opinions of the Attorney General and the 
[OLC] will likely be valued only to the extent they are viewed by others in the executive branch, the 
courts, the Congress, and the public as fair, neutral, and well-reasoned”). 
 96 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 74, at 1142 (expressing that OLC opinions “are most val-
uable if they appear to take the law seriously”); David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 126 
HARV. L. REV. F. 21, 26 (2012), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol126_
fontana.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NH5-FPQF] (summarizing competing views of OLC’s authority); see 
also Morrison, supra note 10, at 1722 (noting that executive actors “ha[ve] a great interest in being 
able to answer the questions that inevitably arise . . . by pointing to an OLC opinion upholding the 
action—and for the opinion to be taken seriously as a sober work of legal analysis by officials not 
precommitted to the outcome” (emphasis omitted)). Some commentators argue that OLC’s reputation 
for independence is the result of institutional incentives that prompt OLC to “offer more cautious legal 
advice” than other executive branch entities. Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal 
Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 494 (1993) (considering OLC’s independence). 
 97 One notable incident that undermined OLC’s reputation for independence involved the so-
called “torture memos” of the early 2000s, which opined on the lawfulness of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s interrogation program under George W. Bush and whose legal reasoning was vehemently 
criticized from both inside and outside the Department of Justice. See, e.g., OFF. OF PRO. RESP., DEP’T 
OF JUST., INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING IS-
SUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION 
TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 260 (2009) (concluding that OLC’s memoranda had “ma-
jor flaws” and that OLC “depart[ed] from [its] traditional practices” in drafting the memoranda)); R. 
Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos, WASH. POST (July 4, 2004), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/07/04/slim-legal-grounds-for-torture-memos/f0756889-
f426-44ea-beb6-dc4834babb52/ [https://perma.cc/JG2X-QCMC] (describing the “storm of criticism 
that erupted” when the memos were made public). OLC largely rehabilitated its reputation by, inter 
alia, rescinding the offending memos. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 158; Scott Shane et al., 
Obama Reverses Key Bush Security Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/
2009/01/23/us/politics/23obama.html [https://perma.cc/A4SB-55U7]. It also issued new guidance for 
“best practices” emphasizing OLC’s role as a source of “honest appraisal[s] of [the] law.” Barron 
Memorandum, supra note 86. But see ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 95 (arguing that the “torture 
memos” were not anomalies). The incident may, however, have diminished OLC’s role in national 
security decision making. See Jack Goldsmith, The Decline of OLC, LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/decline-olc [https://perma.cc/U5BH-CNXS] (arguing that OLC has 
assumed a less prominent role concerning national security issues). 
 98 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 74, at 1133; Morrison, supra note 15. 
 99 Morrison, supra note 10, at 1693 (footnote omitted). 
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attorneys are tasked with providing “[legal] advice based on [their] best under-
standing of what the law requires,” rather than merely seeking legal justifica-
tions for desired policy positions.100 Their job is to “provide an accurate and 
honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that appraisal will constrain the 
Administration’s or an agency’s pursuit of desired practices or policy objec-
tives.”101 In other words, the Office seeks to produce memos more akin to ju-
dicial decisions than to advocates’ briefs. 
OLC’s practice of “adhering to its own precedents even across admin-
istrations” is another means by which the Office seeks to establish “some dis-
tance and relative independence from the immediate political and policy pref-
erences of its clients across the executive branch.”102 OLC “maintains a com-
prehensive internal database of its legal advice,”103 accords “great weight to 
any relevant past opinions,” 104 and thinks hard before overruling or deviating 
from past decisions of Attorneys General and the Office irrespective of the 
previous administrations’ political affiliations. The Office and those relying on 
its arguments to support their position frequently point to OLC’s consistency 
across administrations of both parties as evidence of its analysis’s impartiality. 
A more intangible factor that burnishes OLC’s reputation is the quality of 
the attorneys that tend to work there. Jobs in that office are prestigious ones, 
and they tend to go to highly credentialed, effective attorneys. Alumni of OLC 
have gone on to become federal judges, including some Supreme Court Justic-
es, United States Attorneys General, Solicitors General, deans and faculty 
members of some of the country’s best law schools, and some of the most ef-
fective practicing attorneys in the nation.105 The quality of attorney reinforces 
OLC’s authoritative reputation in two ways. First, the work product itself tends 
to be exceptionally well written and persuasive. Second, because this is usually 
the case, consumers of OLC memos are predisposed to view them as thorough, 
accurate, and fair.  
                                                                                                                           
 100 Barron Memorandum, supra note 86. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 74, at 1133. 
 103 Morrison, supra note 10, at 1711. 
 104 Barron Memorandum, supra note 86, at 2. 
 105 Examples of former OLC attorneys include Chief Justices William Rehnquist and John Rob-
erts, and Justice Antonin Scalia; former Dean of Yale Law School Harold Koh and Dean of N.Y.U. 
Law School Trevor Morrison, as well as professors at those and other top law schools, such as Har-
vard (Jack Goldsmith) and Georgetown (Marty Lederman); Solicitor General and noted litigator The-
odore Olson; Attorneys General Nicholas Katzenbach and William Barr; multiple circuit court judges, 
such as the First Circuit’s David Barron and the Fourth Circuit’s Michael Luttig; and the list goes on. 
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2. Some OLC Opinions Are Not Like the Others 
Even the staunchest defenders of OLC as an independent voice recognize, 
however, that what it produces is not the “best” view of the law in the same 
way that a judicial actor might perceive it. Rather, it seeks “its best view of the 
law.”106 The difference between the two is that “OLC’s institutional location 
within the executive branch,”107 means that its “analyses may . . . reflect the 
institutional traditions and competencies of that branch of the Government.”108 
As such, OLC’s “distinctive incentives and traditions” differ from those of tru-
ly neutral arbiters, such as federal judges.109 The result is that, “at least on 
close questions, OLC’s views may . . . tilt in a more pro-executive direction” 
than those of courts or legal practitioners.110 
This tilt, of course, has obvious implications for OLC’s separation-of-
powers opinions. The Office might be relatively independent from a political 
standpoint, but that does not mean it is impartial when it comes to juxtaposing 
the institutional interests of the executive branch with those of Congress. De-
termining where the line between executive and legislative power lies is differ-
ent from the work that OLC does with solely intra-executive implications. In 
its role “as, in effect, outside counsel” for executive branch agencies,111 it is 
typically asked to answer questions such as, for example, the scope of an agen-
cy’s regulatory authority, or the proper interpretation of an agency’s organic 
statute.112 In such disputes, individual executives might have different policy 
preferences, so it is hard to identify what would constitute a “pro-executive” 
opinion. 
It is not so when it comes to separation-of-powers disputes. According to 
OLC’s own views, the Office has “a constitutional obligation . . . to assert and 
maintain the legitimate powers and privileges of the President against inad-
                                                                                                                           
 106 Morrison, supra note 10, at 1714. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Barron Memorandum, supra note 86, at 2; see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 35 (quoting 
former head of OLC describing OLC’s legal advice to the President as being “something inevitably, 
and uncomfortably, in between” the kind of “advice from a private attorney” and “a politically neutral 
ruling from a court”); McGinnis, supra note 95, at 399 (arguing that executive branch separation-of-
powers analysis should incorporate the executive branch’s institutional interests, on the assumption 
that other branches of government will incorporate their own interests). 
 109 Fontana, supra note 96. 
 110 Morrison, supra note 10, at 1717. But see ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 94 & n.27 (providing 
rare examples of OLC opinions that explicitly reject executive assertions of power). 
 111 Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 12. 
 112 See, e.g., Whether the Food & Drug Admin. Has Jurisdiction Over Articles Intended for Use 
in Lawful Executions, 2019 WL 2235666, at *1 (O.L.C. May 3, 2019); Reconsidering Whether the 
Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 2018 WL 7080165, at *1 (O.L.C. Nov. 2, 2018); The 
Scope of State Crim. Jurisdiction Over Offenses Occurring on the Yakama Indian Rsrv., 2018 WL 
3800128, at *1 (July 27, 2018). 
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vertent or intentional congressional intrusion.”113 Moreover, OLC has 
acknowledged that it is often difficult to determine when Congress crosses the 
line to infringe on executive prerogatives.114 There is thus, by definition, a 
range of reasonable views, and OLC is institutionally predisposed to come 
down on the pro-executive side of the spectrum. 
Nor is consistency across administrations of different parties evidence of 
impartiality in separation-of-powers analyses. Indeed, any other result would 
be unexpected. Precedents that defend robust views of executive power will 
benefit presidents regardless of party affiliation. Although they might use such 
powers for different ends, neither Democratic nor Republican executives will 
be ideologically disposed to promote Congress’s interests over that of the ex-
ecutive branch. So, adherence to OLC precedent by administrations of both 
parties might support characterizing the Office as “independent” when it 
comes to issues with a clear partisan valence. But when it comes to questions 
of the executive’s institutional power, consistently pro-executive positions 
from OLC say less about OLC’s independence than they do about its location 
within the executive branch. 
The fact that most information conflicts are resolved through negotiations 
exacerbates OLC’s pro-executive predisposition. When its legal opinions form 
the basis of initial negotiating positions, OLC is incentivized to adopt a position 
that is extremely pro-executive, because it must leave room to concede some 
ground to Congress. And because judicial resolutions of these issues are so rare, 
OLC need not worry whether a court would endorse its initial position.115 
Another OLC tradition tends to expand its view of presidential preroga-
tives. If an executive branch entity proposes a course of action that OLC de-
termines to be unlawful, the Office will not memorialize that determination in 
writing, but instead will seek to find other lawful means of achieving that enti-
ty’s goals—a process that one scholar has labeled the “facilitative ap-
proach.”116 As a result, OLC’s written legal advice will discuss the lawfulness 
of the alternative policy, but it will make no mention of the actions it deter-
mined the executive cannot take. Indeed, it is OLC policy not to memorialize 
legal advice regarding actions that ultimately were not taken for fear of deter-
                                                                                                                           
 113 The Const. Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 126 
(1996). 
 114 Id. at 132 (recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing “between minor (but unconstitutional) 
aggrandizement and (constitutional) exercises of Congress’s broad investigative and oversight pow-
ers”). 
 115 See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
 116 See Morrison, supra note 10, at 1719; see also Memorandum from David J. Barron, supra 
note 86, at 2 (“OLC’s analyses may appropriately reflect the fact that its responsibilities also include 
facilitating the work of the Executive Branch and the objectives of the President, consistent with the 
law.”). 
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ring executive agencies from seeking OLC’s counsel.117 This phenomenon is 
not limited, of course, to separation-of-powers questions, but it has significant 
implications in that context. As one commentator explains, the President 
“would neither need nor want a formal OLC opinion that concluded Congress 
did have the constitutional power” to act in ways contrary to the President’s 
preferences; “[o]n the other hand, if OLC had concluded [Congress’s actions] 
were unconstitutional and the President decided to press that view, . . . [OLC’s 
views would] become public—because the White House would have relied on 
that opinion to make its case to Congress and the public.”118 As a result, OLC’s 
written opinions—and especially written opinions that are publicly released—
“may tend to memorialize more of its yes’s than its no’s,” resulting in a set of 
written precedents documenting what the President may do, while leaving un-
said what the President may not do.119 
OLC’s reputation as a neutral arbiter of the law is thus subject to question 
in the context of its separation-of-powers opinions. When the institutional bias 
inherent in these opinions combines with OLC’s reputation as an independent, 
apolitical actor, the result is a powerful weapon in the executive’s arsenal. 
B. The Advantages OLC Memos Confer on the Executive 
In this Section, I discuss the ways this weapon generates systemic inter-
branch advantages for the executive—providing a first-mover advantage,120 
articulating executive-friendly characterizations of existing law and past prac-
tice,121 providing political cover,122 and discouraging compromise.123 
1. Creating a First-Mover Advantage 
Simply as a matter of timing, having OLC’s legal analysis handy provides 
the executive with the first-mover advantage.124 The list of legal issues relevant 
to inter-branch information conflicts tends to be finite, with the same questions 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Memorandum from David J. Barron, supra note 86, at 3 (noting that OLC’s “practice is to 
issue [an] opinion only if [the relevant agency commits in writing] that it will conform its conduct to 
[OLC’s] conclusion”). 
 118 Pildes, supra note 70, at 1399. 
 119 Morrison, supra note 10, at 1719–20. 
 120 See infra notes 124–148 and accompanying text. 
 121 See infra notes 149–195 and accompanying text. 
 122 See infra notes 196–223 and accompanying text. 
 123 See infra notes 224–234 and accompanying text. 
 124 See, e.g., Christenson & Kriner, supra note 84, at 773 (pointing out that the President’s first-
mover position gives the White House an advantage “in shaping the content of media coverage”); 
Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L., ECON. & 
ORG. 132, 138 (1999) (“[P]residents are particularly well suited to be first-movers and to reap the 
agenda powers that go along with it.”). 
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recurring again and again—the scope of congressional investigative authority, 
the amenability of executive branch officials to congressional subpoena, the 
availability of executive privilege, and the implications of congressional con-
tempt citations being the most common. As a result, OLC is likely to have the 
relevant legal analysis on file. By simply surveying its archives for prior anal-
yses of the issue and updating these analyses to address the factual circum-
stances of the ongoing dispute, OLC can provide a sophisticated legal defense 
of its position—one that emphasizes the fact that executives of both parties have 
invoked it over the years—in short order. Given the quality of the attorneys who 
tend to staff OLC, this legal analysis will be coherent and well crafted. And 
OLC’s reputation for political independence will lend its verdict gravitas. 
The ability to present an erudite legal position produced by a highly re-
spected office at the onset of a dispute confers on the executive significant 
power to control the narrative through which that dispute is viewed. As an ini-
tial matter, the President can use his bully pulpit to ensure that his preferred 
narrative is disseminated.125 The fact that this narrative is based in a single le-
gal opinion that is authoritative across the executive branch ensures that the 
President, as well as his surrogates and supporters, will coalesce around a con-
sistent, unified message. Thus, from the outset, the executive articulates the 
idea that it is simply following valid, legitimately derived legal advice. The 
mainstream media will then accurately report this position as a statement of the 
executive’s view of the applicable law.126 Even if neither the President nor sub-
sequent media coverage mentions OLC or its memos specifically, they will 
often describe the executive’s view as one based on Justice Department legal 
analysis, or “long-standing executive policy,” or some other characterization 
supporting the President’s assertion that he is not acting lawlessly.127 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Peake, Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy, 54 POL. RSCH. Q. 
69, 69 (2001) (“The traditional model of agenda setting suggests Presidents are influential—indeed 
the most influential—agenda setters in national government.” (first citing FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER 
& BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); then citing JOHN W. 
KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984); and then citing RICHARD E. 
NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 
FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1960)). 
 126 E.g., Alan Rappeport, Justice Dept. Backs Mnuchin’s Refusal to Release Trump’s Tax Returns, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/us/politics/trump-tax-returns-justice-
department.html [https://perma.cc/VXX5-6E9C] (describing an OLC memo as “cas[ting] doubt” on 
the “formal rationale” by Congress to obtain President Trump’s tax returns); Charlie Savage, Justice 
Dept. Defends Legality of Trump’s Appointment of Acting Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/politics/matthew-whitaker-justice-dept-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/N8HQ-VJXQ] (stating that the Justice Department argued that President Trump’s 
appointment of Matt Whitaker as Acting Attorney General “complied with both federal statutes and 
the Constitution”). 
 127 E.g., Associated Press, Pelosi Asks Justice Dept. to Pursue 2 Bush Aides, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/29/washington/29contempt.html [https://perma.cc/DAF3-
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Once the executive’s initial articulation of the issue is deployed, subse-
quent media coverage and commentary tend to entrench and amplify the Presi-
dent’s framing. The pundit class—political and media elites, and perhaps most 
importantly legal elites—such as current and former government lawyers, law 
professors, and legal analysts in the media—will weigh in with their anal-
yses.128 They appear on cable news shows,129 publish op-eds in traditional 
mainstream media outlets,130 tweet their views out to all of their fellow legal-
elite followers,131 and opine in one or more legal blogs or podcasts, thereby 
pervading the legal-elite echo chamber.132 These analyses will necessarily take 
the form of responding to the President’s characterization of the situation, 
thereby reaffirming the President’s initial framing. The legal experts likely to 
weigh in publicly are, moreover, likely to magnify the structural advantage that 
                                                                                                                           
EA39] (quoting the White House’s invocation of “‘longstanding department precedent’ against letting 
a United States attorney refer a Congressional contempt citation to a grand jury or prosecute an execu-
tive branch” official); Peter Baker, Mueller Delivered a Message. Washington Couldn’t Agree on 
What It Was., N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/us/politics/mueller-
resigns-special-counsel.html [https://perma.cc/7RW4-EV99] (noting “longstanding Justice Depart-
ment policy barring the indictment of a sitting president”); Charlie Savage, Explaining Executive 
Privilege and Sessions’s Refusal to Answer Questions, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/06/15/us/politics/executive-privilege-sessions-trump.html [https://perma.cc/5Z6E-
J9S8]. 
 128 See Susan Herbst, Political Authority in a Mediated Age, 32 THEORY & SOC. 481, 489 (2003) 
(noting that authority can derive from various sources—political power, issue expertise, or media 
exposure). 
 129 Many of CNN’s legal analysts, such as Jeffrey Toobin and Susan Hennessey, for example, are 
executive branch alumni. 
 130 See, e.g., Bob Bauer, Trump’s Stonewalling of Congress Is Illegal. How Far Will He Push It?, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/04/29/trumps-stone
walling-congress-is-flatly-unconstitutional-how-far-will-he-push-it/ [https://perma.cc/4A33-HKKU] 
(former White House Counsel); Jack Goldsmith, Will Donald Trump Destroy the Presidency?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-
destroy-the-presidency/537921/ [https://perma.cc/HFA9-PPHD] (former head of OLC); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Opinion, I Wrote the Special Counsel Rules. The Attorney General Can—and Should—Release 
the Mueller Report., WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/
23/i-wrote-special-counsel-rules-attorney-general-can-should-release-mueller-report/ [https://perma.
cc/W3JE-QVKN] (former Acting Solicitor General and long-time Justice Department attorney). 
 131 See, e.g., Rob Barthelmess, Twitter List of Law Professors, LEAST DANGEROUS BLOG (June 
24, 2017), https://leastdangerousblog.com/2017/06/24/twitter-list-of-law-professors/ [https://perma.cc/
R735-CUJZ] (collecting all law professors’ twitter handles). 
 132 See, for example, the blogs BALKINIZATION, https://balkin.blogspot.com/ [https://perma.cc/
5226-MCHV]; LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/ [https://perma.cc/M7W6-F6X2]; TAKE 
CARE, https://takecareblog.com/ [https://perma.cc/LL88-DGG9], as well as podcasts like Amicus, 
SLATE, https://slate.com/podcasts/amicus [https://perma.cc/G4ZT-NZLH]; Lawfare Podcast, LAW-
FARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/topic/lawfare-podcast [https://perma.cc/2TJ4-F4DJ]; Political 
Gabfest, SLATE, https://slate.com/podcasts/political-gabfest [https://perma.cc/2M4M-KS7R]; Stay 
Tuned with Preet Bharara, CAFÉ, https://cafe.com/stay-tuned-podcast/ [https://perma.cc/3RLJ-3P3Y]. 
Most of these have lawyers as hosts as well as frequently hosting lawyers as guests to discuss the 
news of the day. 
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OLC provides to the President because most of them are veterans of executive 
branch lawyering generally, or of OLC in particular.133 Lawyers with experience 
on congressional committees or in individual Members’ offices are, by contrast, 
few and far between.134 And although there is no empirical study measuring the 
effect of these types of statements, the public-opinion impact of elites’ reaction 
to executive policy is well established.135 
This is not to say that these legal experts, political commentators, and 
media pundits always will support the executive branch’s legal position as a 
substantive matter—often they do not. But their response to the President in-
voking OLC opinions will itself be newsworthy, thereby expanding both the 
salience of the memos and the breadth of the audience exposed to the execu-
tive’s message. The legal experts in particular are, moreover, inclined to re-
spect OLC’s output, and by referencing its opinions, they amplify the authori-
tative nature of its pronouncements, even if they do so in the context of critiqu-
ing the specific analysis at issue.136 This, in turn, lends credence to the argu-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Examples of frequent public commentators are Bob Bauer, former White House Counsel; Jack 
Goldsmith, former head of OLC; Eric Posner, former OLC Attorney Advisor; Marty Lederman, for-
mer head of OLC; Neal Katyal, former Acting Solicitor General; Marc Thiessen, former speechwriter 
for President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; and Andrew McCarthy, 
former federal prosecutor. Indeed, the legal-pundit world is remarkably homogenous, made up of 
individuals who graduated from the same law schools, clerked for the same judges, worked at the 
same Justice Department or White House posts, and went on to join the same academic faculties. See 
Fontana, supra note 96, at 27 n.48 (“Every single head of OLC during its existence either attended a 
top-five law school, clerked on the lower courts or Supreme Court, or was a law professor.”); id. at 27 
(“Many of the lawyers in OLC and [the White House Counsel’s office] were either before or will later 
become law professors, or have biographies similar to those of law professors.”). Parenthetically, the 
same can be said for most Supreme Court justices—some of whom also are alumni of OLC—and 
social science research has shown that justices with executive branch experience, are more likely to 
side with the executive in cases before them. See, e.g., Rob Robinson, Executive Branch Socialization 
and Deference on the U.S. Supreme Court, 46 LAW & SOC. REV. 889 (2012). 
 134 Preet Bharara, former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, might be 
the exception that proves the rule. Bharara, who hosts a successful podcast with wide listenership, 
worked for Senator Chuck Schumer on the Senate Judiciary Committee, but his public profile is large-
ly based on his time as a federal prosecutor in the Justice Department (and his high-profile firing by 
Donald Trump). Jennifer Senior, Preet Bharara’s Lessons on Crime and Punishment, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/books/review/preet-bharara-doing-justice.html 
[https://perma.cc/8ND8-AQR3]. 
 135 See, e.g., Douglas L. Kriner & Eric Schickler, Investigating the President: Committee Probes 
and Presidential Approval, 1953–2006, 76 J. POL. 521, 522 (2014) (“Public opinion scholars have 
long recognized that the reactions of other political elites often drive support for presidents and their 
policy initiatives.”); Matthew C. Woessner, Scandal, Elites, and Presidential Popularity: Considering 
the Importance of Cues in Public Support of the President, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 94, 98 (2005) 
(noting that “average citizens rely on [elite] expertise” to contextualize accusations of misconduct). 
 136 See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 130 (reporting that a former White House Counsel referenced OLC 
opinions on congressional oversight to critique the President’s response); Johnathan Schaub, Executive 
Privilege and Compelled Testimony of Presidential Advisers: Don McGahn’s Dilemma, LAWFARE (May 
3, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/executive-privilege-and-compelled-testimony-presidential-
advisers-don-mcgahns-dilemma [https://perma.cc/B3ML-BGGX] (reporting that a former OLC attor-
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ment that the President is simply following legal advice—even if there are 
those who disagree with that legal advice. Because the intricacies of the legal 
arguments within the memos present more nuance than most contemporary 
public discussion can accommodate, the mere existence of the opinion support-
ing the executive’s behavior will be the story, and that can be enough—
especially for that segment of the public predisposed to support the President 
in the first place.137 In this way, the executive can reap the narrative-based 
benefits of OLC opinions regardless of what they actually say. 
By contrast, Congress has no comparable depository of easily accessible, 
authoritative legal analysis.138 There is no OLC-equivalent in the legislative 
branch.139 Anyone that seeks to determine what legal positions Congress took 
on a similar issue in the past—even congressional staff140—must dig out old 
legal briefs or scour committee reports in hopes of finding a definitive state-
ment.141 Even if some members of Congress are able to quickly articulate their 
own view, Congress has no mechanism for developing legal positions common 
                                                                                                                           
ney provided legal analysis of OLC’s position regarding testimonial immunity and executive privilege 
with respect to testimony of former White House Counsel Don McGahn).  
 137 See Thomas J. Leeper & Rune Slothuus, Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public 
Opinion Formation, 35 ADVANCES POL. PSYCH. 129, 142 (2014) (“[T]he interactions between parties 
and citizens are instrumental for how citizens connect their predispositions to political opinions.”). 
 138 Nongovernmental groups have tried to fill this gap in the context of specific issues. See 
Emerging Case Law on Congressional Oversight, LEVIN CTR. WAYNE L., https://oversightcases.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/LBQ8-ED6H] (collecting information related to congressional oversight-related litiga-
tion); Public Document Clearinghouse: Congressional Russia Investigations, JUST SEC. (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/62240/congressional-russia-investigations-document-clearinghouse/ [https://
perma.cc/WK9D-Z2HM] (collecting all materials related to congressional investigations regarding 
Russia’s efforts to interfere in U.S. elections). 
 139 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 71, at 443 (“The fact that Congress lacks an institutional 
counterpart to the Office of Legal Counsel . . . is an illustration of the executive branch’s greater insti-
tutional focus.”); Shane, supra note 43, at 477 (“[O]ther than statutes, conventional formats for ex-
pressing congressional legal opinion are not well established.”). 
 140 See BERMAN, supra note 43, at 68 n.111 (citing interview with former General Counsel to the 
United States House of Representatives, Stanley M. Brand). 
 141 As examples, some congressional legal arguments are articulated in memoranda from the 
House of Representatives’ General Counsel in response to letters from the Justice Department arguing 
that Congress is not lawfully entitled to the information it seeks. See, e.g., Memorandum from Stanley 
M. Brand, Gen. Couns. to the Clerk, U.S. House of Reps., to Hon. Elliott H. Levitas, Chair, Sub-
comm. on Investigations & Oversight, Attorney General’s Letter Concerning Subpoena for Docu-
ments to Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 8, 1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. 
NO. 97-89 (1982), at 39–47 [hereinafter Brand Memorandum 1]; Memorandum from Stanley M. 
Brand, Gen. Couns. to the Clerk, U.S. House of Reps., to Hon. John Dingell, Attorney General’s Let-
ter Concerning Claim of Executive Privilege for Department of Interior Documents (Nov. 10, 1981), 
reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON ENERGY & COM., 97TH 
CONG., EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: LEGAL OPINIONS REGARDING CLAIM OF PRESIDENT RONALD 
REAGAN IN RESPONSE TO A SUBPOENA ISSUED TO JAMES G. WATT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 5–
14 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter Brand Memorandum 2] (laying out arguments refuting the execu-
tive’s position regarding a claim of executive privilege). The only place these particular memoranda 
seem to be accessible to the public is as part of committee reports that run into the hundreds of pages. 
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to all members. There is, of course, plenty of constitutional analysis that goes 
on in the legislative branch.142 In the context of disputes with the executive, 
however, each member tends to develop (or decline to develop) her own legal 
views.143 These views tend to reflect, at best, an individual Member’s legal 
assessments, and at worst, political expedience, rather than a calculation of 
Congress’s institutional interests.144 To the extent Congress speaks with one 
voice on any given legal issue, that agreement is ad hoc, likely shaped by the 
views of the majority regarding ongoing disputes.145 Even if the House or Sen-
ate Counsel issues a statement of its view of the law, that statement does not 
play the same role as OLC memos. As an initial matter, such a statement is not 
binding on legislators.146 Moreover, there may be outspoken disagreement be-
tween the majority and minority parties, thereby undermining the force of the 
analysis.147 And regardless of the unanimity or lack thereof, Congress’s posi-
tions do not invoke preexisting legal analysis to support them.148 Congress’s 
atomized, ad hoc approach to legal reasoning is a barrier to the development of 
an institutional body of consistent precedent and the legal or political legitima-
cy that accompanies it. Lacking an effective means of articulating a unified 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Much of it takes place on an ad hoc basis, with legislative staff, the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS), or the General Accounting Office (GAO) assessing the lawfulness of particular pieces 
of legislation. See Fisher, supra note 79, at 65–71. Both the House and the Senate have a Legal Coun-
sel’s office, which primarily handles litigation. See id. at 75–81. 
 143 Shane, supra note 43, at 477 n.55 (“It could be argued that any search for constitutional inter-
pretation by Congress is especially misguided because of doubts as to Congress’s institutional capaci-
ty to engage in constitutional interpretation meaningfully.”). But see Louis Fisher, Constitutional 
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707, 747 (1985) (arguing that Congress has 
the resources and ability to provide strong constitutional analysis, in part because “[m]uch of constitu-
tional law depends on factfinding and the balancing of competing values, areas in which Congress 
justifiably can claim substantial expertise”). 
 144 See Levinson, supra note 65, at 955 (noting that congressional legal opinions, when they are 
articulated at all, are “mostly determined not by the institutional interest of Congress but by the views of 
their constituents (and, difficult to disaggregate, their own personal policy preferences)”); Moe & How-
ell, supra note 124, at 144 (noting that “all might benefit if they could cooperate in defending or advanc-
ing Congress’s power, but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the local constituency”). 
 145 See Fisher, supra note 79, at 65–74 (describing the development of legal positions within 
congressional staff agencies, such as the CRS). 
 146 See Shane, supra note 43, at 479 n.62 (“It is problematic whether the counsel to the clerk is 
viewed as an authoritative lawmaker even within Congress.”). 
 147 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 79, at 78 (describing conflict between the majority and minority 
regarding whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled the minority to more 
committee seats than the majority had allotted). 
 148 For example, Congress often rejects executive branch claims of testimonial immunity for 
White House advisors. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 110-423, at 6 (2007) (rejecting former White House 
Counsel’s claim to immunity from testifying before Congress). But those rejections tend to be con-
clusory statements, rather than full-fledged legal analysis, unless and until the matter is litigated. 
The hearing at which former White House Counsel Harriet Miers refused to appear took place on 
July 12, 2007, whereas the Judiciary Committee issued its report explaining the majority’s position 
four months later. Id. at 1, 6. 
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congressional position, the legislative branch is much less well suited to con-
trolling the frame through which its conflicts with the executive are viewed. 
2. Declaring “What the Law Is” 
Because of OLC’s reputation as neutral, independent expositors of the 
best view of the law, the presence of an OLC memo enables the executive to 
make aggressive claims that the law is on his side. Recall, however, that OLC’s 
legal pronouncements represent OLC’s best view of the law as an executive 
branch institution that tilts in a pro-executive direction.149 The opinions them-
selves, however, make no mention of this important distinction. They nearly 
always characterize their conclusions as “what the law is,” as Chief Justice 
John Marshall would say, rather than as an argument made by an advocate on 
one side of a disputed question of law.150 
A memorandum regarding how the Justice Department handles criminal 
referrals from Capitol Hill alleging contempt of Congress provides an exam-
ple.151 Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 194, willful failure to comply with a congressional 
subpoena is a federal misdemeanor.152 Congress “shall . . . certify” this failure 
“to the appropriate United States attorney whose duty it shall be to bring the 
matter before the grand jury for its action.”153 OLC has analyzed how these stat-
utes should apply to contempt certifications regarding executive officials whose 
defiance of congressional subpoenas results from executive-privilege assertions 
made at the President’s direction. The Office maintains that prosecution of such 
officials would “so inhibit the President’s ability to make such claims [of exec-
utive privilege] as to violate the separation of powers.”154 The memorandum 
does not, however, present its conclusion as one interpretation of the constitu-
tionality of applying section 194 to executive officials. Instead, the memoran-
dum’s first sentence states unequivocally that “a United States Attorney is not 
required to refer a congressional contempt citation to a grand jury or otherwise 
to prosecute an Executive Branch official who carries out the President’s in-
struction to invoke the President’s claim of executive privilege before a com-
                                                                                                                           
 149 See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text. 
 150 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). There are exceptions; some 
memos devote significant space to recognizing valid counterarguments, but this is not the norm. See, 
e.g., The Const. Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124 (1996) 
(providing a thoughtful examination of many separation of powers issues). 
 151 Prosecution for Contempt of Cong. of an Exec. Branch Off. Who Has Asserted a Claim of 
Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101 (1984). 
 152 2 U.S.C. § 192. 
 153 Id. § 194. 
 154 Prosecution for Contempt of Cong. of an Exec. Branch Off. Who Has Asserted a Claim of 
Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. at 129. 
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mittee of Congress.”155 Because courts historically have been reluctant to in-
tervene in congressional-executive conflicts over legislative oversight activity, 
OLC’s opinions are likely to stand as the only articulated position on this legal 
question indefinitely.156 And although the statement may be true as a matter of 
executive branch interpretation of the law, Congress’s practice of holding ex-
ecutive officials in contempt of Congress as recently as 2012 reveals that it 
takes a different view.157 But the memorandum fails to engage with Congress’s 
position. Rather, it offers its own views as a factual statement of the law. This 
creates the impression that the executive branch position is the only reasonable 
legal conclusion, not simply an assertion of executive branch opinion or an 
opening position in a negotiation.158 
This pattern is repeated in memorandum after memorandum. On multiple 
separation-of-powers questions, OLC memos purport to articulate the state of 
the law, but fail to indicate the ways that those conclusions reflect the Office’s 
pro-executive tilt.159 Not only do the memos fail to acknowledge their institu-
tional bias, they often amplify it over time. Once OLC has reached a particular 
conclusion regarding executive power, subsequent analyses tend to reinforce 
that conclusion, stating it more definitively as years pass, regardless of whether 
such increased certainty is warranted.160 A given proposition might be support-
ed by a string cite of impressive length, but because the Office treats past opin-
ions as binding precedent,161 frequently this string cite will be made up of 
nothing but previous OLC memos on the same issue.162 OLC’s statement of its 
                                                                                                                           
 155 Id. at 101. 
 156 See The Const. Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 180 
(1996) (noting that many issues OLC addresses never go before the courts and therefore demand par-
ticularly careful analysis because the judiciary is restrained by constitutional and prudential considera-
tions from intervening). 
 157 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 711, 112th Cong. (2012) (holding Attorney General Eric Holder in con-
tempt of Congress). 
 158 One commentator has argued that whereas Congress views the relevant question as what it is 
entitled to, the executive views the matter as transactional, and its stated legal positions are essentially 
negotiating tactics. See Wright, supra note 35, at 920. 
 159 See Morrison, supra note 8, at 1502 (noting the “pro-executive tenor” of OLC opinions that 
“defends its institutional prerogatives against incursions” by the legislative or judicial branch). 
 160 Cf. ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 105 (noting that over time, OLC passes on “increasingly 
presidentialist” memoranda, effectively operating as a “ratchet”). 
 161 Morrison, supra note 10, at 1714; see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 74, at 1133 (“OLC 
has developed a range of practices and traditions—including a strong norm of adhering to its own 
precedents even across administrations.”); Moss, supra note 8, at 1325. 
 162 See, e.g., Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Couns. to the President, 2019 
WL 2315338, at *1 (O.L.C. May 20, 2019) (pointing out that OLC “has endorsed [the principle that 
the President and his immediate advisors are absolutely immune from testimonial compulsion] on 
more than a dozen occasions, over the course of the last eight presidential administrations,” and 
providing references to about a dozen opinions reaching that conclusion). OLC will occasionally con-
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position thus becomes more and more emphatic each time the issue arises, de-
spite the absence of any additional corroborating authority beyond the con-
sistency and longevity of the Office’s own internal precedent. 
The issue of testimonial immunity is illustrative. Then-Assistant Attorney 
General William Rehnquist’s 1972 opinion (Rehnquist Memorandum) is the 
first available Justice-Department analysis of the issue.163 In it, Rehnquist con-
cludes that “[t]he President and his immediate advisers . . . should be deemed 
absolutely immune from testimonial compulsion by a congressional commit-
tee.”164 A decade later, then-Assistant Attorney General Ted Olson quoted this 
language in a memo recommending that the President’s White House Counsel 
should not submit to a Senate Committee’s subpoena.165 And by May of 2019, 
the head of OLC was able to claim that “[t]he immunity of the President’s im-
mediate advisers from compelled congressional testimony . . . has long been 
recognized” (notably, he did not indicate by whom it had been recognized).166 
Yet as Judge John Bates of the District of Columbia District Court pointed out 
in 2008, “the only authority that the Executive can muster in support of its ab-
solute immunity assertion are two OLC opinions” that are “for the most part 
conclusory and recursive” and therefore unpersuasive.167 The subsequent OLC 
re-articulation of the testimonial immunity principal “respectfully disagree[s]” 
with Judge Bates and “adhere[s] to [OLC’s] long-established position.”168 Re-
cently, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected 
OLC’s testimonial immunity position.169 
Moreover, OLC’s subsequent references to then-Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Rehnquist’s conclusion fail to indicate that he had included important ca-
veats: he stressed that existing precedents were “obviously quite inconclusive” 
and that “any generalizations” drawn from the historical incidents he relied 
upon to inform his analysis “are necessarily tentative and sketchy.”170 Ten 
                                                                                                                           
sider longstanding views afresh. See Prosecution for Contempt of Cong. of an Exec. Branch Official 
Who Has Asserted a Claim of Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 101 (1984). 
 163 See Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns. to 
Hon. John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affs., Power of Congressional 
Committee to Compel Appearance or Testimony of “White House Staff” 7 (Feb. 5, 1972) [hereinafter 
Rehnquist Memorandum] (on file with author). 
 164 See id. 
 165 Olson Memorandum, supra note 23, at 2 (arguing that a President’s advisers are not required 
to testify before Congress). 
 166 Testimonial Immunity, 2019 WL 2315338, at *1, *15. 
 167 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 104 (D.D.C. 2008). The other opinion, 
this one about former White House Counsel Don McGahn’s claim of testimonial immunity, reached 
the same conclusion. Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 168 Testimonial Immunity, 2019 WL 2315338, at *10. 
 169 See McGahn, 968 F.3d at 778. 
 170 See Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 163, at 6–7. Rehnquist also emphasized that the 
precedents were particularly weak in supporting the claim of testimonial immunity for anyone not 
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years later, the OLC opinion finding that the White House Counsel need not 
submit to a congressional subpoena failed to include this qualifying language 
when quoting from the 1972 memo, simply asserting that, “[a]s Assistant At-
torney General for the [OLC] William H. Rehnquist expressed it in 1972, ‘The 
President and his immediate advisers, that is, those who customarily meet with 
him on a regular or frequent basis—should be deemed absolutely immune from 
testimonial compulsion by a congressional committee.’”171 Thus, a “tentative” 
and “sketchy” conclusion subject to exceptions is transformed solely by the 
passage of time and repetition into a long-recognized principle that now ap-
plies, according to OLC, even to former presidential advisors.172  
Aspects of OLC’s treatment of executive privilege follow a similar pat-
tern. The Justice Department first articulated in writing “the doctrine of execu-
tive privilege as it relates to requests from Congressional committees for exec-
utive branch information” in 1977.173 As in the Rehnquist Memorandum, here 
OLC characterized its conclusions as “tentative and sketchy,” and conceded 
that “materials properly subject to claims of [e]xecutive privilege may be dis-
closed to Congress in cases involving Senatorial confirmation of Presidential 
nominations or in impeachment proceedings.”174 That same memorandum also 
included the concession that, if an assertion of executive privilege were litigat-
ed, it is possible that “the Court would hold that any demand from the Con-
gress is sufficient . . . to overcome the privilege.”175 Ignoring this sentiment, 
subsequent memoranda characterized Congress’s ability to overcome the privi-
lege much more narrowly, asserting that courts would be likely to find that 
“the interest of Congress in obtaining information for oversight purposes” was 
                                                                                                                           
reporting directly to the President, id. at 6–8, and noted that the executive has an obligation to “furnish 
some knowledgeable witness in response to a congressional request for testimony” regarding the exe-
cution of the law. Id. at 8–9. 
 171 Olson Memorandum, supra note 23, at 1. 
 172 See Immunity of Former Couns. to the President from Compelled Cong. Testimony, 31 Op. 
O.L.C. 191, 192 n.2 (2007) (citing Hist. of Refusals by Exec. Branch Offs. to Provide Info. Demanded 
by Cong., 6 Op. O.L.C. 751, 771–72 (1982)) (justifying extending the immunity analysis to former 
advisors by pointing to former President Harry Truman’s refusal to comply with a subpoena from the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities). Note, however, that even if OLC is correct regarding 
testimonial immunity for current executive officials, this justification does not necessarily succeed. 
Compare Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 758 (1982) (conferring absolute immunity from civil suit 
on former Presidents for official acts they took while in office), with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 812 (1982) (extending executive officials other than the President and prosecutors qualified, 
rather than absolute, immunity). 
 173 See Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., 
to All Heads of Offs., Divs., Bureaus & Bds. of the Dep’t of Just., Executive Privilege 1 (May 23, 
1977) [hereinafter Harmon Memorandum] (on file with author) (outlining “in a general way the doc-
trine of [e]xecutive privilege as it relates to requests from Congressional committees for Executive 
branch information and documents”). 
 174 Id. at 5, 7. 
 175 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
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too generalized to overcome valid assertions of executive privilege,176 despite 
the fact that Congress plausibly has argued that such a claim lacks any support-
ing authority and ignores evidence supporting Congress’s arguments.177 
OLC’s determination that Congress cannot require executive officials to 
be prosecuted for contempt of Congress was also originally tentative, empha-
sizing that the memorandum’s conclusions “should be limited to controversies 
similar to the one to which this memorandum expressly relates, and the general 
statements of legal principles should be applied in other contexts only after 
careful analysis.”178 Again, subsequent memoranda omit these caveats. First, in 
one paragraph in a 1995 memorandum addressing the applicability of a com-
pletely different statute to executive action, the Office stated in conclusory 
fashion that “the criminal contempt of Congress statute does not apply to the 
president or presidential subordinates who assert executive privilege.”179 Over 
a decade later, OLC reiterated this unequivocal conclusion, this time with re-
spect to a former executive official: “[t]he Department of Justice has long tak-
en the position, during administrations of both political parties, that ‘the crimi-
nal contempt of Congress statute does not apply to the President or presidential 
subordinates who assert executive privilege.’”180 In presenting its views as de-
finitive statements of law despite these historical caveats, OLC’s memoranda 
ensure that the dominant legal argument associated with the ongoing conflict 
will be one that favors the executive branch. 
3. Characterizing History 
OLC separation-of-powers opinions also allow the executive to harness 
the impact that narratives about historical practice can have on public opinion 
formation. The historical narratives about previous conflicts are often inextri-
cably intertwined with the legal arguments. As OLC recognizes, past practice 
is integral to shaping constitutional understanding in the inter-branch context, 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to a Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27, 27 
(1981); see also Assertion of Exec. Privilege Concerning the Dismissal & Replacement of U.S. 
Att’ys, 2007 WL 5038036, at *2 (June 27, 2007) (“Broad, generalized assertions that the requested 
materials are of public import are simply insufficient under the ‘demonstrably critical’ standard [that 
the D.C. Circuit applied in 1974].” (quoting Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities 
v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc))). 
 177 Brand Memorandum 2, supra note 141, at 7. 
 178 Prosecution for Contempt of Cong. of an Exec. Branch Off. Who Has Asserted a Claim of 
Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 103 (1984). 
 179 Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Fed. Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 
350, 356 (1995). 
 180 Whether the Dep’t of Just. May Prosecute White House Offs. for Contempt of Cong., 32 Op. 
O.L.C. 65, 66 (2008) (quoting id.). 
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where judicial decisions are few and far between.181 OLC’s internal guidelines 
stress the importance of historical precedent in deriving constitutional mean-
ing,182 and the memoranda reflect this directive.183 Thus, when it comes to 
constitutional analysis of where to draw the line between congressional and 
executive authority as a legal matter, OLC memos rely heavily on their charac-
terization of past executive branch practices—a characterization with which 
other observers may or may not agree.184 There are, for example, memoranda 
purporting to document the history of testimonial immunity for close presiden-
tial advisors185 and assertions of executive privilege.186 So the very legal posi-
tions reached in the memos often rest on an assessment of how the executive 
has responded to similar conflicts in the past. 
As with its purely legal analyses, however, OLC’s discussion of past prac-
tice displays a tendency to view the past through executive-branch-colored 
glasses. As an initial matter, such claims sometimes fail to acknowledge the 
existence of past inconsistent practice. Again, there is a recent example. A 
2019 OLC memorandum asserts that the executive’s “position on testimonial 
immunity reflects historical practices dating back nearly to the 1939 estab-
lishment of the Executive Office of the President” and that, “‘at least since the 
Truman Administration,’ presidential advisers ‘have appeared before congres-
sional committees only where the inquiry related to their own private affairs or 
where they had received Presidential permission.’”187 The opinion does con-
                                                                                                                           
 181 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997) (incorporating evidence of historical prac-
tice into analysis whether legislators had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(arguing that “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning to the 
words of a text”); Olson Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3 (noting that when “there are no clear, fully 
applicable judicial precedents” regarding inter-branch conflicts, “custom or practice tends to become a 
legal precedent”); Wright, supra note 35, at 891 (“[T]he views and historical practices of a branch as 
to its own power vis-à-vis coordinate branches have independent constitutional significance.”). 
 182 See, e.g., Barron Memorandum, supra note 86, at 1, 2 (stating as a “[g]uiding [p]rinciple” that 
OLC’s “analysis should focus on traditional sources of constitutional meaning,” including “the histor-
ical record illuminating the text’s meaning”). 
 183 See, e.g., Hist. of Refusals by Exec. Branch Offs. to Provide Info. Demanded by Cong., 6 Op. 
O.L.C. 782 (1983) (providing examples of refusals by executive officials to comply with congressional 
information requests); Hist. of Refusals by Exec. Branch Offs. to Provide Info. Demanded by Cong., 6 
Op. O.L.C. 751 (1982). 
 184 See infra notes 189–193 and accompanying text. 
 185 Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 163, at 5–6 (cataloguing assertions of testimonial im-
munity). 
 186 See generally Hist. of Refusals by Exec. Branch Offs. to Provide Info. Demanded by Cong., 6 
Op. O.L.C. at 751–52. 
 187 Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Couns. to the President, 2019 WL 
2315338, at *7 (O.L.C. May 20, 2019) (quoting Letter from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. 
of Legal Couns., to Phillip E. Areeda, Couns. to the President (Sept. 25, 1974), https://www.justice.
gov/olc/page/file/1225976/download [https://perma.cc/7TBR-844W]). 
550 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:515 
cede that presidents “have occasionally permitted such testimony,” but then 
reaffirms that “the long-standing policy has been to decline invitations for vol-
untary appearances and to resist congressional subpoenas for involuntary 
ones.”188 But those statements are not supported by history.189 Presidential ad-
visors have appeared before Congress regularly. Former White House Coun-
sels for Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George H.W. Bush all 
testified before Congress.190 The same has been true of Special Assistants and 
Special Counsels to the President as well as presidential administrative assis-
tants, physicians, military aides, personal secretaries, and more.191 
Perhaps more importantly, however, the difference between a consistent 
past practice that reflects a shared understanding of the law between Congress 
and the executive, and a consistent executive branch position in which Con-
gress has never acquiesced is a legally significant one.192 Even if the executive 
branch has maintained the same policy position over time, this consistency 
alone does not dictate constitutional meaning. Indeed, that Congress continues 
to subpoena executive officials and even to go to court to enforce such sub-
poenas on occasion indicates that it disagrees with this interpretation of what 
the separation of powers requires.193 Yet OLC treats bipartisan executive adop-
tion of a policy as evidence that it should be binding on Congress as well.194 
                                                                                                                           
 188 Id. 
 189 E.g., Brand Memorandum 1, at 39–47 (contesting, with examples, then-Attorney Gen. William 
French Smith’s claim that the executive had consistently refused to share law enforcement files with 
Congress); CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31351, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS’ TESTIMONY BEFORE CON-
GRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: AN OVERVIEW (2014) (collecting instances of presidential advisor testi-
mony as well as instances of presidential advisors’ refusal to testify); Michael Stern, OLC’s Law Of-
fice History of Testimonial Immunity, POINT OF ORDER (June 5, 2019), https://www.pointoforder.
com/2019/06/05/olcs-law-office-history-of-testimonial-immunity/ [https://perma.cc/W956-L9SC] 
(noting instances when the executive branch deviated from its claims of testimonial immunity that are 
not mentioned in OLC’s memos). 
 190 See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 189; Mitchell Locin, Clinton Staffers Maintain a Solid 
Whitewater Front, CHI. TRIB. (July 29, 1994), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1994-
07-29-9407290194-story.html [https://perma.cc/KTT4-S6KJ] (describing testimony of former White 
House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum). 
 191 See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 189; Guide to Congressional Oversight Precedent, CO-
EQUAL, https://www.co-equal.org/guide-to-congressional-oversight [https://perma.cc/J7TG-KK4N]. 
 192 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 71, at 438 (pointing out that presidential practice should 
not alone dictate constitutional meaning in the absence of assurance that Congress’s acquiescence 
“reflects a mutually acceptable institutional bargain or achieves a desirable balance of power”); Brad-
ley & Morrison, supra note 74, at 1106; Stern, supra note 189 (arguing that the force of OLC’s argu-
ments regarding the significance of a consistent past practice is diminished “in the absence of . . . 
congressional acquiescence”). 
 193 See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 575 F. Supp. 2d 201, 202 (D.D.C. 2008) (seeking 
to enforce subpoenas of White House Chief of Staff and former White House Counsel). 
 194 See, e.g., Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Couns. to the President, 2019 
WL 2315338, at *2 (O.L.C. May 20, 2019) (“The Rehnquist Memorandum has been consistently 
reaffirmed by administrations of both political parties, most recently during the Obama Administra-
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Courts would be unlikely to infer constitutional meaning from a consistent ex-
ecutive branch practice repeatedly rejected by Congress, yet OLC treats con-
gressional objections as essentially irrelevant.195 
4. Generating Political Cover 
Because of the salience of law and historical practice when it comes to in-
ter-branch conflicts, the executive’s ability to disseminate effectively the claim 
that law and history are on his side provides not only substantive talking 
points, but also valuable political cover. As an initial matter, allegations that 
the President is acting unlawfully are one of Congress’s most powerful means 
of curbing public support for presidential action.196 Because the media pays 
attention to such allegations,197 Congressional characterization of the executive 
as uncooperative, intransigent, or infringing on congressional prerogatives 
rooted in the Constitution can draw (negative) attention to the President’s ac-
tions,198 damage the President’s standing with the public, and sometimes even 
generate pressure sufficient to force executive compliance or compromise.199 
The existence of a legal memorandum affirming the President’s course of ac-
                                                                                                                           
tion.”); Whether the Dep’t of Just. May Prosecute White House Offs. for Contempt of Cong., 32 Op. 
O.L.C. 65, 67 (2008) (citing to the Department of Justice’s position under administrations of both 
parties, testimony offered by executive officials, and prior OLC memos for the proposition that refusal 
of executive officials “to produce documents or testimony over which the President has asserted exec-
utive privilege did not constitute a crime”). 
 195 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
Constitution . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President . . . .” (empha-
sis added)). 
 196 See Christenson & Kriner, supra note 84, at 770 (noting that when Congress supplies “a coun-
ter-narrative to that advanced by the White House,” it can hinder “presidents’ ability to rally the pub-
lic to their side”); Kriner & Schickler, supra note 135, at 531 (“Congress can raise the political costs 
of certain executive actions by alleging abuses of power . . . .”). 
 197 See, e.g., DINO P. CHRISTENSON & DOUGLAS L. KRINER, THE MYTH OF THE IMPERIAL PRES-
IDENCY: HOW PUBLIC OPINION CHECKS THE UNILATERAL EXECUTIVE 72 (2020) (“Because journal-
istic norms of newsworthiness increasingly value political conflict, the media plays a significant role 
in magnifying congressional challenges to presidential unilateral actions.”); PROJECT ON GOV’T 
OVERSIGHT, THE ART OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 43 (2d ed. 2015) (“It’s newsworthy when the 
executive branch does[] [not] comply with the legislative branch’s duty to conduct oversight.”); 
Basinger & Rottinghaus, supra note 62. 
 198 See Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 163 (“When the President claims [e]xecutive privi-
lege and refuses either to divulge a document or to permit a witness to testify, he immediately draws 
to himself some criticism for ‘withholding’ relevant evidence from the Congress or from the public.”); 
Wright, supra note 35, at 942 (“Congress has advantages in the political framing of oversight disputes 
because the Executive is in the position of resisting a congressional investigative process.”). 
 199 See PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, supra note 197, at 43 (“Attention garnered from news 
coverage can lead to pressure from the top that shakes down the information needed.”); Wright, supra 
note 35, at 929 (noting that the executive branch damages public confidence in the government). 
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tion as lawful or consistent with past practice, however, dilutes the force of any 
allegations of lawlessness.200 It allows the President to invoke OLC—and its 
reputation for impartial legal analysis—as a shield, and to argue that instead it 
is Congress that is overstepping legal bounds. 
A recent example is the White House’s use of this tactic to defend Presi-
dent Trump’s decision to instruct his former White House Counsel, Don 
McGahn, not to testify before Congress regarding allegations that the President 
had obstructed the Justice Department’s investigation into Russian interference 
with the 2016 election.201 As noted above, a series of OLC memoranda dating 
back to the early 1970s maintains that neither the President nor his “close advi-
sors” can be compelled to testify before Congress,202 and that this principle 
continues to apply even after those advisors have left office.203 When the 
White House Press Secretary can point to an OLC memorandum stating that, 
“based on long-standing, bipartisan, and Constitutional precedent, the former 
Counsel to the President cannot be forced to give such testimony,” it blunts the 
impact of congressional allegations of executive wrongdoing.204 To the extent 
this shield is effective in muting criticism, it neutralizes Congress’s ability to 
sell the narrative as one of presidential misconduct.205 If the President is, after 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 96 (“When its authoritative-looking pronouncements appear 
at moments of crisis, the OLC can provide the president with crucial legal reinforcement . . . .”); Brad-
ley & Morrison, supra note 74, at 1125 (“[T]he president is in a better position to defend the action’s 
legality if he can point to an OLC opinion upholding it.”). 
 201 See Sonam Sheth, There’s a Huge Loophole in a New DOJ Filing That Trump Cited to Block 
Don McGahn from Testifying Before Congress, BUS. INSIDER (May 20, 2019), https://www.business
insider.com/justice-department-olc-memo-don-mcgahn-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/J8XS-3A2Z] (ob-
serving that White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders pointed to a “memo from [OLC] ‘stating that, 
based on long-standing, bipartisan, and Constitutional precedent, the former Counsel to the President 
cannot be forced to give such testimony’”). 
 202 E.g., Immunity of the Couns. to the President from Compelled Cong. Testimony, 20 Op. 
O.L.C. 308, 308 (1996) (“It is the longstanding position of the executive branch that ‘the President 
and his immediate advisors are absolutely immune from testimonial compulsion by a Congressional 
committee.’” (quoting Harmon Memorandum, supra note 273, at 5)); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
supra note 189, at 21 (discussing executive branch immunity arguments). OLC’s position on this issue 
dates back to 1972. See Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 163, at 7 (“The President and his imme-
diate advisers—that is, those who customarily meet with the President on a regular or frequent basis—
should be deemed absolutely immune from testimonial compulsion by a congressional committee.”). 
 203 Rachael Bade et al., White House Blocks Former Counsel McGahn from Testifying to Con-
gress, WASH. POST (May 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-intends-
to-block-former-counsel-mcgahn-from-testifying-to-congress/2019/05/20/47f61f94-7b1b-11e9-a5b3-
34f3edf1351e_story.html [https://perma.cc/66UA-8ASF]. 
 204 Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Couns. to the President, 2019 WL 
2315338, at *1 (O.L.C. May 20, 2019). (noting that testimonial immunity “applies to former senior 
advisers such as the former White House Counsel”). 
 205 Kriner & Schickler, supra note 135, at 528 (finding that “sustained media attention is needed 
for charges of wrongdoing to seep into the consciousness and political evaluations of a relatively inat-
tentive public”). 
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all, simply following the advice of his (widely respected) Justice Department 
advisors, Congress’s assertions to the contrary can be characterized as hyper-
bolic or hysterical. Further, if the memorandum acknowledges that there are 
some contexts in which the President’s discretion is constrained—limiting 
claims of executive privilege to communications that involve the President 
personally, for example—the memorandum’s existence may actually bolster 
the executive’s law-abiding image.206 
This political shield becomes more powerful the longer the OLC opinion 
stands and the more well known it becomes. If the President had simply de-
clared in response to Congress’s subpoena of McGahn that he was asserting 
“testimonial immunity” for White House staff, he would be vulnerable to 
charges of violating the law by refusing to comply with duly issued subpoenas. 
Even an OLC opinion, if drafted during an ongoing conflict, remains suscepti-
ble to the charge that it was outcome-driven, and the usual presumption of 
OLC independence might be at least partially discounted.207 
Indeed, some of the novel opinions emerging from President Trump’s 
OLC have been met with significant skepticism. Both their contents and the 
timing of their production have been viewed as more the product of political 
expediency than lawyerly analysis.208 Whether these memoranda will become 
more convincing if OLC sustains those positions in subsequent administra-
tions, only time can tell. It is also too soon to know whether the criticism of the 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 912–
13 (2007) (pointing out that by constraining his own power in some ways, the President can make 
himself appear trustworthy, thereby actually empowering him); Shirin Sinnar, Essay, Rule of Law 
Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 1572 (2016) (arguing that the executive seeks 
to project an image of an institution that “can responsibly police itself” by adopting legal standards 
that sound as if they constrain executive action (even if they do not)). 
 207 See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 104 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismiss-
ing an OLC opinion as unpersuasive because, inter alia, it was “hastily issued on the same day that the 
President” told his advisor to invoke absolute immunity). 
 208 See Noah Feldman, Opinion, Justice Department Independence? Not with Trump, BLOOM-
BERG (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-22/trump-has-cowed-the-
justice-department-s-office-of-legal-counsel [https://perma.cc/9CJG-LUCJ] (“[T]he OLC memo was 
presented to the world as part of Trump’s [impeachment] defense team’s filing. That’s stunning for an 
office of the Department of Justice that once prided itself on exercising independent judgment from 
the rest of the department and the executive branch. It’s clear that today’s OLC has been recruited 
wholesale into Trump’s defense.”); Kel McClanahan, How One Secretive Justice Department Office 
Can Sway the Whole Government, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2019/09/26/how-one-secretive-justice-department-office-can-sway-whole-government/ [https://
perma.cc/YL8W-PGPE] (criticizing an OLC memo “justifying the withholding from Congress of the 
whistleblower complaint about Trump’s communications with Ukraine”); Shalev Roisman, The Real 
Decline of OLC, JUST SEC. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66495/the-real-decline-of-olc/ 
[https://perma.cc/W446-QV67] (“OLC’s very public involvement in the most controversial policies of 
this White House has done great harm to the Office’s legitimacy.”). 
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output of the Trump OLC will more broadly undermine the value of OLC 
opinions from subsequent administrations. 
If the assertion of testimonial immunity rests on decades-old OLC analy-
sis, however, that presumption becomes likely to retain its full force, regardless 
of who invokes it. This is so despite the fact that OLC itself initially drafted the 
policy and repeatedly reaffirmed it amidst previous controversies.209 In effect, 
the administration who first adopts the policy pays much of its political costs. 
The passage of time then “launders” the argument, and what might have been 
seen at one time as political expediency eventually can be characterized as 
longstanding, independent legal analysis. This allows subsequent executives to 
take advantage of OLC’s pro-executive conclusions without the appearance of 
self-aggrandizement at Congress’s expense, allowing the President to cast his 
resistance not as a dramatic claim to unilateral executive power, but rather a 
simple restatement of familiar policy. 
Consider in this respect the response to President Trump’s 2019 assertion 
that he would refuse to comply with any and all congressional subpoenas be-
cause Congress simply lacked oversight power.210 This statement, which was a 
novel view of the constitutional balance of power, was met with a great deal of 
surprise, criticism, and outrage, with the strategy described variously as “re-
markable,”211 unprecedented,212 “extreme,”213 and infuriating,214 to name a 
few. That the Justice Department would not prosecute anyone for contempt of 
Congress if they asserted executive privilege at the President’s instruction, 
however, was met with a collective shrug of the shoulders in comparison. The 
public debate simply took as a given that element of the legal landscape and 
focused not on rebutting the argument but rather on whether other consequenc-
                                                                                                                           
 209 For example, OLC’s opinions determining that sitting Presidents may not be indicted or prose-
cuted were drafted in 1973, during the Watergate investigation into President Nixon and the investigation 
into whether Vice President Spiro Agnew had accepted bribes, and in 2000, during Independent Counsel 
Kenneth Starr’s investigation into President Clinton. See Rosalind S. Helderman, On Question of Ob-
struction, Mueller Hewed to Untested Justice Department Opinions and ‘Principles of Fairness,’ WASH. 
POST (May 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-question-of-obstruction-mueller-
hewed-to-untested-justice-department-opinions-and-principles-of-fairness/2019/05/29/d21605e2-823a-
11e9-bce7-40b4105f7ca0_story.html [https://perma.cc/W2BW-6A9C]. 
 210 See Savage, supra note 1 (“‘We’re fighting all the subpoenas,’ Mr. Trump told reporters out-
side the White House.”). 
 211 Id. (discussing the Trump Administration’s response to the investigation of Russian interfer-
ence in the 2016 election). 
 212 Id. (quoting former House of Representatives lawyer Charles Tiefer’s assertion that “[t]he 
president is attempting to repeal a congressional power of oversight that goes back to the administra-
tion of George Washington”); see also Hulse, supra note 26 (“‘This is a massive, unprecedented and 
growing pattern of obstruction,’ said Representative Elijah E. Cummings . . . .”). 
 213 Hulse, supra note 26. 
 214 Id. (describing Democrats as furious about the Trump Administration’s refusal to cooperate). 
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es might flow from a contempt vote.215 Much was made of the novelty of the 
blanket refusal, with comparisons to the less combative positions taken by pre-
vious executives, whereas the problem of enforcing congressional subpoenas 
was largely ascribed to the existence of a longstanding policy.216 
In effect, the memos advancing positions based on either consistent past 
practice or a longstanding legal opinion provide yet another public-facing argu-
ment: “this is how we have always done it.”217 Thus, to the extent that consisten-
cy strengthens the executive argument that its longstanding position is the right 
one, OLC seeks to provide evidence of that consistency.218 As with the issue of 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See, e.g., Griffin Connolly, Nadler Prepares Contempt Vote for McGahn—but What Are the 
Consequences?, ROLL CALL (May 21, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/2019/05/21/nadler-prepares-
contempt-vote-for-mcgahn-but-what-are-the-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/P4JT-JZF3] (discussing 
Representative Adam Schiff’s exploration of the idea that Congress could “levy fines against officials 
who flout congressional subpoenas”); Lisa Desjardins, What Happens if Attorney General Barr Is Held 
in Contempt of Congress?, PBS (May 8, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-happens-if-
attorney-general-barr-is-held-in-contempt-of-congress [https://perma.cc/LT77-SFRK] (noting that, for 
the past decade, contempt of Congress votes against executive officials have had no consequences); 
Nicholas Fandos, House Plan Vote to Fight Barr in Court but Back Off Contempt, N.Y. TIMES (June 
6, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/us/politics/house-contempt-resolution.html [https://
perma.cc/Y8RZ-X4AR] (pointing out that the practical impact of holding executive officials in con-
tempt is negligible, because “there is almost no chance the department would ever prosecute them”). 
 216 See, e.g., Hulse, supra note 26 (contrasting past cases exhibiting mutual recognition of Con-
gress’s legitimate oversight power, which led both Republican and Democratic administrations to 
reach a negotiated accommodation, with the Trump White House’s “firm edict against cooperation”). 
 217 See, e.g., Letter from Att’y Gen. William French Smith, to Congressman John D. Dingell 
(Nov. 30, 1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 97-968, at 39 (Comm. Rep.) (“The policy [of not sharing 
confidential law enforcement files with congressional overseers] was first expressed by President 
Washington and has been reaffirmed by or on behalf of most of our Presidents, including Presidents 
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Eisenhower.”); Testimonial 
Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Couns. to the President, 2019 WL 2315338, at *1 (O.L.C. May 
20, 2019) (“We provide the same answer that the Department of Justice has repeatedly provided for 
nearly five decades: Congress may not constitutionally compel the President’s senior advisers to testi-
fy about their official duties.”); Cong. Subpoenas of Dep’t of Just. Investigative Files, 8 Op. O.L.C. 
252, 262 (1984) (“The policy of the Executive Branch throughout this Nation’s history has been gen-
erally to decline to provide committees of Congress with access to, or copies of, open law enforce-
ment files except in extraordinary circumstances.”); Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
to Congressman John Linder (Jan. 27, 2000) (on file with author) (“The Department’s longstanding 
policy is to decline to provide Congressional committees with access to open law enforcement files.”). 
 218 See, e.g., Auth. of Individual Members of Cong. to Conduct Oversight of the Exec. Branch, 
2017 WL 5653624, at *1 (O.L.C. May 1, 2017) (asserting that “the Executive Branch’s longstanding 
policy has been to engage in the established process for accommodating congressional requests for 
information only when those requests come from a committee, subcommittee, or chairman authorized 
to conduct oversight”); Whether the Dep’t of Just. May Prosecute White House Offs. for Contempt of 
Cong., 32 Op. O.L.C. 65, 66 (2008) (“The Department of Justice has long taken the position, during 
administrations of both political parties, that ‘the criminal contempt of Congress statute does not apply 
to the President or presidential subordinates who assert executive privilege.’” (quoting Application of 
28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Fed. Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 350, 356 (1995))); Auth. 
of Agency Offs. to Prohibit Emps. from Providing Info. to Cong., 28 Op. O.L.C. 79, 79 (2004) (“Con-
sistent with longstanding Executive Branch positions, Department of Health and Human Services 
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testimonial immunity, OLC can often support its assertions regarding the 
longstanding nature of its position by pointing to an impressive string of opin-
ions making the same claim across several decades.219 Media reports and legal 
analyses then emerge based not on the fact of executive branch consistency (that 
may or may not actually exist), but on the fact of the executive branch’s claim of 
consistency.220 In stories about the amenability of sitting presidents to indictment 
and prosecution221 or claims of testimonial immunity,222 for example, reporters 
and commentators repeatedly reference the historic provenance of the executive 
branch legal position, indirectly supporting the President’s claim of consistency 
and thus legality. These opinions are, in other words, akin to a legal Potemkin 
                                                                                                                           
officials have the authority to prohibit officers or employees of the Department from providing infor-
mation to Congress.”). 
 219 See, e.g., Immunity of the Assistant to the President & Dir. of the Off. of Pol. Strategy & Out-
reach from Cong. Subpoena, 2014 WL 10788678, at *1 (O.L.C. July 15, 2014) (“The Executive 
Branch’s longstanding position, reaffirmed by numerous Administrations of both political parties, is 
that the President’s immediate advisers are absolutely immune from congressional testimonial pro-
cess.”); Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 163. The Justice Department roots this immunity in the 
constitutional separation of powers and the President’s immunity from congressional compulsion to 
testify. Immunity of Former Couns. to the President from Compelled Cong. Testimony, 31 Op. O.L.C. 
191, 192 (2007) (“If a congressional committee could force the President’s appearance” to testify 
before it, “fundamental separation of powers principles—including the President’s independence and 
autonomy from Congress—would be threatened.”); Assertion of Exec. Privilege with Respect to 
Clemency Decision, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (1999) (arguing that just as the President “may not compel 
congressmen to appear before him,” “[a]s a matter of separation of powers, Congress may not compel 
him to appear before it” (quoting Olson Memorandum, supra note 23, at 2)); Milton Bracker, Truman 
Rejects Subpoena of House as His ‘Duty’ Under the Constitution; Committee Will Not Act Against 
Him, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1953, at A1 (summarizing President Truman’s argument in a letter to the 
Committee on Un-American Activities that the separation of powers doctrine “would fall . . . and the 
presidency shrink to a mere arm of the Legislative Branch . . . if the President should feel during his 
term that his ‘every act might be subject to official inquiry and possible distortion for political purpos-
es’”). 
 220 E.g., Savage, supra note 126 (reporting that the Justice Department argued that President 
Trump’s appointment of Matt Whitaker as Acting Attorney General was not only lawful but also “that 
it fit within a history of similar designations dating back to the earliest days of the country”). 
 221 See, e.g., Jan Wolfe, Can a Sitting U.S. President Face Criminal Charges?, REUTERS (Feb. 
26, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-indictment-explainer/can-a-sitting-u-s-
president-face-criminal-charges-idUSKCN1QF1D3 [https://perma.cc/CPC2-N4FE] (“The U.S. Justice 
Department has a decades-old policy that a sitting president cannot be indicted, indicating that crimi-
nal charges against Trump would be unlikely, according to legal experts.”). 
 222 See, e.g., Elliot Hannon, Trump Administration Formally Instructs Former White House 
Counsel to Disobey Congressional Subpoena to Testify, SLATE (May 20, 2019), https://slate.com/
news-and-politics/2019/05/trump-administration-formally-instructs-former-white-house-counsel-to-
disobey-congressional-subpoena-to-testify.html [https://perma.cc/D6TG-X4QW] (noting that the 
White House Counsel argued that “[t]his long-standing principle [of testimonial immunity for White 
House advisers] is firmly rooted in the Constitution’s separation of powers and protects the core func-
tions of the presidency, and we are adhering to this well-established precedent in order to ensure that 
future Presidents can effectively execute the responsibilities of the Office of the Presidency”). 
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village. They erect a convincing façade of legality, giving presidential action 
legitimacy, even if their contents cannot stand up to scrutiny.223 
5. Discouraging Compromise 
OLC memoranda create concrete impediments to congressional success 
as well. In some ways, OLC memoranda are pre-commitment devices for the 
executive. They set the executive’s original bargaining position and discourage 
the President from compromising, even if he might prefer to do so in a given 
conflict—because the President believes the information Congress seeks will 
vindicate his position, or because a swift capitulation will remove an ongoing 
scandal from the headlines.224 Part of OLC’s mandate is to preserve presiden-
tial prerogatives against congressional encroachment.225 As temporary “stew-
ards” of the institution in which they work, political appointees are “‘often 
moved to preserve the values and reputation of that institution,’ even at the cost 
of compromising an administration’s immediate policy goals.”226 OLC’s policy 
of adhering to the Office’s past precedents ensures that the prerogatives of the 
presidency as an institution are guarded across administrations and by appoin-
tees of either political party.227 One memorandum suggesting that President 
George H.W. Bush’s White House Counsel decline to comply with a congres-
sional subpoena to testify reflects the Office’s solicitude for its role as the pro-
tector of presidential prerogatives. In it, OLC notes that allowing the Presi-
dent’s close advisors to testify before Congress creates the impression “that 
such testimony is a matter of legislative right, not executive grace.”  It further 
asserts that “yielding once tends to ultimately produce subsequent, more fre-
quent, more vigorous demands” and warns that establishing a custom of sub-
mitting to subpoenas “would tend to create a damaging legal precedent.”228 So 
the memoranda themselves can serve as roadblocks to conflict resolution. 
                                                                                                                           
 223 For a discussion of the flaws in OLC separation-of-powers memoranda as reliable statements 
of the law, see supra Part II.A.2. 
 224 See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 43, at 1133 (noting that sometimes “the institutional interests of 
the presidency may require an assertion of executive privilege that conflicts with other of the Presi-
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 225 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 226 See David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 6–7 (2018) (quoting Jack Goldsmith, Lawyerly Integrity in the Trump Administration, LAW-
FARE (May 14, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawyerly-integrity-trump-administration [https://
perma.cc/4STM-ZEZY])); Wright, supra note 35, at 943 (“The executive branch agency head will 
have an incentive to produce all the requested materials in an effort to end the scrutiny, but [OLC] and 
the White House may want the agency to continue principled objections to the requests that implicate 
broader executive branch interests.”). 
 227 Barron Memorandum, supra note 86, at 2 (instructing that “[OLC] should not lightly depart 
from . . . past decisions”). 
 228 Olson Memorandum, supra note 23. 
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In stark contrast, Congress’s incentive to compromise is particularly 
strong. All of the costs of delay fall on Congress—the executive’s entire goal is 
to maintain the status quo and avoid sharing the information Congress has re-
quested.229 This institutional distinction has implications for both ongoing and 
future disputes. In the context of ongoing disputes, it makes congressional 
compromise for the sake of political expediency more likely.230 With no single 
actor playing the role of guardian of institutional prerogatives, Members seek-
ing executive branch information have no incentive to resist compromise for 
the sake of an abstract legal theory, even if doing so would strengthen the hand 
of future Congresses and public sentiment would ultimately vindicate their 
position.231 As for future disputes, such compromises will provide additional 
fodder for executive arguments that past practice favors its position. For exam-
ple, legislative committees often permit presidential advisors to testify before 
Congress on a “voluntary” basis—i.e., not in response to a subpoena.232 This 
compromise allows the executive to maintain its position on testimonial im-
munity for presidential advisors, while simultaneously permitting Congress to 
access the information it seeks. At the same time, however, it both fails to es-
tablish the principle that such officials are obligated to testify even when their 
appearance is not voluntary and allows the executive to maintain its 
“longstanding” position regarding testimonial immunity.233 
These are all reasons to believe that OLC’s work product not only reflects 
a predisposition to expansive views of executive authority, but that OLC’s cod-
ified articulation of those views operates to advantage executive branch efforts 
to resist congressional information requests. This is not to say that OLC’s pro-
nouncements should be deemed “maximally pro-executive positions.”234 But it 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 163, at 6–7 (noting that “[i]n a strictly tactical sense, 
the Executive Branch has a head start in any controversy with the Legislative Branch . . . . [because] 
[a]ll the Executive has to do is maintain the status quo, and he prevails”); Wright, supra note 35, at 
930 (“As the holder of the status quo, the Executive Branch does not benefit from rapid escalation.”). 
 230 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1034–35 (arguing that “[t]he divergence between the 
interests of individual legislators and the institutional interests of Congress” weakens Congress’s 
negotiating leverage). 
 231 Id. at 1026 (“Actors avoid confrontation when it is privately beneficial to do so, even if con-
flict would create precedents that would benefit future generations, all else equal, by clarifying the 
rules of the game.”). 
 232 See Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Couns. to the President, 2019 WL 
2315338, at *7, *12 (O.L.C. May 20, 2019) (arguing that accommodating congressional requests to 
hear from senior presidential advisers does not “compromise the underlying immunity of the President 
or his senior presidential advisors”). 
 233 Id. at *10. It is possible that Congress could stand on principle, challenge the executive’s tes-
timonial-immunity views in court, for example, and lose. This would, of course, weaken the bargain-
ing power for future Congresses. But both courts to address the issue have found in Congress’s favor. 
See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Comm. on the Judiciary 
v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 108 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 234 Morrison, supra note 10, at 1717. 
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does mean that OLC’s role in inter-branch disputes deserves more attention 
than it has received to date. 
III. LEVELING THE LEGAL PLAYING FIELD 
The tactical advantage that OLC provides to the executive is a function of 
institutional design. A nominally independent arbiter of legal rules, whose loy-
alty is to the executive branch itself, and whose pronouncements are presump-
tively binding across administrations regardless of party affiliation, translates 
into a powerful weapon in the executive’s arsenal when fighting inter-branch 
conflicts. Congress simply lacks such a centralized, high-powered legal office 
producing sophisticated articulations of legal arguments from the legislative 
perspective. 
On the one hand, these distinct institutional dynamics are unsurprising. 
The executive branch is a hierarchical body with a single President at the top, 
whereas Congress is a collective with a much flatter organizational structure. 
Moreover, congressional staffers are far less numerous than the career civil 
servants that perform the bulk of the executive branch’s work. And whereas 
these executive officials tend to be dedicated subject-matter experts who spend 
extended periods of time—sometimes an entire career—in their positions,235 
legislative staffers are devoted to the Member who hired them, rather than to 
Congress as an institution or to any particular substantive mission.236 For these 
and other reasons, it is much easier for the executive to develop and maintain 
over time a single position. 
At the same time, the executive branch is a “they” rather than an “it,” as 
well.237 Each executive branch agency employs its own coterie of lawyers—
the Department of Defense (DOD) alone employs over 10,000 attorneys—
churning out legal analysis on a daily basis.238 And the President can choose at 
                                                                                                                           
 235 See Fontana & Huq, supra note 226, at 45, 79 (noting that “officials who anticipate that their 
career will be entangled with a specific institution have a reason to advance the interests of that insti-
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tana & Huq, supra note 226, at 78. 
 237 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (pointing out that because Congress is a collective body, 
there is no such thing as a single congressional intent). 
 238 Fontana, supra note 96, at 39–41 (describing legal offices within several different executive 
branch agencies and noting that DOD “employs about 10,000 part-time or full-time lawyers”). 
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any time to override OLC’s pronouncements.239 Nevertheless, OLC demon-
strates that it is possible for a collective body to coalesce around and treat one 
institutional position as authoritative. 
To the extent that the structural advantages OLC provides the executive 
are normatively undesirable, reforms should seek to level the playing field. 
There are two primary ways to seek a redistribution of power: reduce OLC’s 
ability to drive the legal conversation, or augment Congress’s ability to do the 
same (or some combination of both). This Part will explore some possibilities, 
focusing first on potential modifications to executive branch institutional ar-
rangements and then on possible legislative branch reforms. Finally, it will con-
sider reforms that do not fit neatly within the scope of either political branch. 
A. Executive Branch Reforms 
The first set of potential reforms involves the operation of OLC itself. The 
Office could reimagine its role as one that sought the best view of the law in-
dependent of its executive branch institutional location. In other words, the 
Office itself could seek to lean more toward the judicial model of legal inter-
pretation, rather than its current independent-but-executive-focused model. 
This would require a radical rethinking of what it means for OLC to be an in-
dependent legal arbiter and would involve insulating the Office in such a way 
as to render it truly independent from both the Attorney General and the Presi-
dent, at least when it comes to separation-of-powers issues.240 Recalibrating 
OLC’s self-image would not be a panacea. Regardless of what legal positions 
it takes, neither the Attorney General nor the President is bound by its views. 
In a world where a truly independent OLC existed, however, presidential com-
pliance with its positions would be a political safe harbor, allowing him to reap 
the same benefits that OLC offers today. Actions taken contrary to OLC’s 
views, by contrast, would impose the political costs that OLC underwriting 
eliminates. Indeed, this dynamic played out in the context of United States mil-
itary intervention in Libya in 2011. On the question whether the United States’ 
involvement in Libya necessitated congressional authorization, OLC answered 
                                                                                                                           
 239 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 17, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html [https://
perma.cc/DDR7-CE6P] (noting that President Obama overruled OLC’s conclusions regarding the 
applicability of the War Powers Resolution to U.S. operations in Libya in 2011). Presidents, and at-
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 240 Distancing OLC from the Attorney General and the President, however, is likely to reduce the 
President’s confidence in the Office and thus undermine its authority within the executive branch. I 
am indebted to Walter Dellinger for pointing out this potential unintended consequence. 
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in the affirmative.241 Rather than follow OLC’s view, however, President 
Obama collected the legal views of not only the Justice Department but also 
DOD and the State Department.242 When only the State Department’s legal 
advisor concluded that Congress need not authorize the military action, the 
President adopted that legal theory.243 This selective use of legal advice was 
not well received in the legal community, and was described as “disturbing” by 
one former acting head of OLC.244 
Another intra-executive modification would be to include in OLC’s sepa-
ration-of-powers analyses a dissenting opinion. Just as military and intelli-
gence agencies employ “red teams” to play devil’s advocate to test the agen-
cy’s conclusions or preferred policies, OLC could institutionalize the practice 
of challenging its own opinions. OLC attorneys could include within their 
memoranda an exposition of any plausible arguments that run counter to their 
conclusion.245 They could, for example, flag issues on which the law is unset-
tled, explore what non-frivolous objections Congress could advance on those 
issues, and make note of inconsistent past practice. Establishing a rule or a tra-
dition requiring such analysis to be included in written work product could 
generate powerful effects. Recall that in many of the foundational memoranda 
on these issues, the drafters took pains to note the preliminary and uncertain 
nature of their conclusions.246 Even modifying OLC practice to acknowledge 
the tentative nature of some of its legal conclusions rather than making defini-
tive statements regarding unsettled law without acknowledging the existence 
of viable counterarguments could temper their opinions’ public force. This 
would eliminate any narrative advantage such definitive statements give the 
President. The executive branch would still be free to advocate for its own 
conclusions and to treat OLC’s legal advice as internally binding. It would 
simply also be required to acknowledge the unsettled nature of the question 
and the existence of colorable contrary claims, much as judges can publish 
dissenting opinions, and congressional reports can include minority views. On 
issues that implicate the separation of powers, OLC attorneys could 
acknowledge neither Congress nor the executive has a better claim to ultimate 
authority regarding what the constitution permits or requires. 
                                                                                                                           
 241 See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, On Libya, President Obama Evaded Rules on Legal Disputes, 
Scholars Say, NBC NEWS (June 21, 2011), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna43474045 [https://
perma.cc/FD3L-DUWL]. 
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 245 There are some examples of OLC doing exactly this, but they are more the exception than the 
rule. See supra note 150. 
 246 See supra notes 171–180 and accompanying text. 
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A more radical extension of this quest for OLC independence would ex-
tricate it from the Justice Department altogether. Consider as a model the Pri-
vacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). The PCLOB is an inde-
pendent agency created in accordance with the conclusions of the 9/11 Com-
mission Report to serve as a civil liberties watchdog over counterterrorism pol-
icy.247 Its five members are selected by the President to staggered six-year 
terms and confirmed by the Senate.248 Board members must come from differ-
ent political parties, and must “be selected solely on the basis of their profes-
sional qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise in civil liberties 
and privacy, and relevant experience.”249 The Board has issued reports on mul-
tiple National Security Agency surveillance programs that include sophisticat-
ed and highly respected legal analysis. Unlike OLC opinions, the PCLOB’s 
view has no binding effect on the executive branch, but its legal conclusions 
have been highly influential in the public debate surrounding government sur-
veillance.250 It therefore provides a model for how the executive branch could 
arrive at more impartial legal conclusions regarding the separation of powers. 
B. Legislative Branch Reforms 
Congress also could adopt internal mechanisms to better serve its long-
term institutional interests. The obvious suggestion is for Congress to create a 
legislative equivalent of OLC.251 Indeed, a recent incident illustrates the possi-
ble impact of such an office. In January 2020, the General Accounting Office 
(GAO)252 issued a finding that President Trump’s withholding of military aid 
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from Ukraine violated the law.253 The GAO’s legal position provided a signifi-
cant legal argument in Congress’s favor and had a meaningful impact on the 
public debate around this highly controversial incident.254 This example, how-
ever, is the exception rather than the rule. 
The Senate sought to create a legislative OLC as part of the 1978 Ethics 
in Government Act but could not get the House to sign on to the plan.255 At 
first blush, it may seem that the individual House and Senate Legal Counsel 
positions might profitably be combined to play this role. After all, the Senate’s 
Legal Counsel is statutorily charged with “defend[ing] vigorously” all “consti-
tutional powers and responsibilities of the Senate or of Congress.”256 In prac-
tice, however, these offices are devoted primarily to handling litigation. The 
executive branch equivalent would be the Justice Department’s civil division, 
rather than OLC. In other words, there is a division of labor in the executive 
between litigators, who are appropriately zealous advocates for the executive’s 
preferred outcome, and the relatively more independent OLC attorneys. More-
over, entrusting the job of producing definitive congressional positions on sep-
aration of powers question to two different offices would result in the possibil-
ity of disparate outcomes. If the Senate took one position on a legal issue and the 
House took another, Congress would fail to capture the advantages that OLC 
provides to the executive. What is needed is a coterie of legal advisors devoted 
to developing an official congressional position when legal questions arise. 
Providing such legal focal points that can unite Members of Congress could 
lower the collective action costs that usually impede congressional action. 
A centralized legal office housed within the legislative branch is not as 
much of an anomaly as it may first appear. In addition to the GAO, the CRS257 
and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)258 are examples of existing statu-
torily created intra-legislative agencies that have successfully served Congress 
as a whole, rather than one party, or one committee, or one Member, for dec-
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 253 See Emily Cochrane et al., G.A.O. Report Says Trump Administration Broke Law in Withhold-
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 254 See id. 
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 256 2 U.S.C. § 288h. 
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ades.259 An Office of Congressional Counsel (OCC) could be created as an en-
tirely separate entity. Congress could, by statute or simply by the use of each 
House’s own internal rules, over which they have complete control, establish 
an OCC and declare that its legal opinions represent the views of Congress as a 
whole. Over time, the office playing this role could develop a reputation for 
independence similar to the one enjoyed by OLC. 
Or an OCC could be housed within an existing legislative office, just as 
OLC is located within the Justice Department. Although the GAO provides the 
recent illustration of the value such an office could have, that agency is not an 
ideal home for an OCC because of its limited mandate. The GAO focuses on 
how taxpayer money is spent, whereas an effective OCC would primarily fo-
cus on separation-of-powers questions.260 Indeed, there were some who argued 
that the GAO’s finding about the President’s delay of military assistance to 
Ukraine exceeded the GAO’s mandate.261 
CRS might be a better fit. Lawyers in CRS already supply Congress with 
their analysis through: detailed, thoroughly researched reports; expert congres-
sional testimony; confidential memoranda prepared for particular members; 
briefings; seminars; and responses to individual inquiries.262 CRS is staffed 
with knowledgeable attorneys who must be hired “without regard to political 
affiliation, and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the posi-
tion.”263 It also already is dedicated to remaining authoritative, objective, and 
nonpartisan.264 CRS staff includes constitutional experts who regularly engage 
in analysis of and provide opinions regarding separation-of-powers ques-
tions.265 When President George W. Bush asserted a claim of privilege over rele-
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 265 See Fisher, supra note 79, at 68. 
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vant information in the course of a congressional inquiry into the use of inform-
ants by Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel in Boston, for example, a CRS 
attorney analyzed the executive-privilege claim and testified before Congress 
that it was “unprecedented.”266 It would be no great leap in such circumstances 
to institutionalize the practice of formalizing such legal conclusions. 
Another advantage of delegating legal analysis to an intra-legislative 
agency is that their employees come and go with much less frequency than 
most congressional staff.267 Indeed, there are attorneys who have spent an en-
tire career in one of these offices.268 One former CRS attorney in particular, 
Morten Rosenberg, has been described as a “one-person OLC” for Congress.269 
Thus, although the rate of turnover among both Members and staff in Congress 
presents an obstacle to developing and memorializing institutional views in the 
same way that the executive branch civil service does, an OCC established 
within or in the image of the CRS could avoid that problem. 
Should it desire to do so, Congress could even make CRS’s separation-of-
powers opinions presumptively binding. Each House of Congress determines 
its own rules.270 There is no reason each House could not include a rule stating 
that CRS legal opinions on separation-of-powers questions reflect the official 
congressional position unless rejected, in any given instance, by a vote in one or 
both chambers. There is no guarantee, of course, that Members would abide by 
these positions. The same can be said about the President with respect to OLC—
he need not comply with their opinion if he chooses not to. There is, however, 
a political cost for defecting.271 
Should Congress decline to establish a full-fledged office to develop insti-
tutional legal positions, another possibility is simply to create a repository of 
congressional legal arguments. Just Security’s clearinghouse sites for congres-
sional documents related to the investigation into Russian election interference 
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could be a model.272 If all of the memoranda, correspondence, legal briefs, and 
legislative history related to inter-branch information conflicts were collected 
in one place, legislators and their staff, journalists, and commentators would 
have easy access to the legal arguments Congress has made in the past. Such a 
repository would not guarantee consistent legislative branch positions. Indeed, 
it likely would highlight the ways that partisan interests drive legislators’ legal 
arguments. But it would supply a source where congressional views regarding 
executive branch legal opinions are preserved, and when those view have been 
consistent over time, that consistency would constitute a strong institutional 
argument for Congress. 
The greatest obstacle to implementing this proposal is congressional will 
itself.273 Perhaps legislators that prize the flexibility to take legal positions that 
advance their own or the constituents’ interests do not want to lose it. Along 
with the benefits that flow from a consistent legal position arrived at through 
independent analysis come the constraints it might impose on Members. Re-
call, for example, the tendency of OLC to resist compromise on legal issues to 
protect the institution of the presidency, regardless of the preferences of the 
current holder of that office.274 But just as the President remains free to disre-
gard OLC’s conclusions when he so chooses, there is nothing that would stop 
Members or future Congresses from disregarding the views of the office. As 
with the presidential example, there might be a political cost to defecting, but 
if a Member concludes that the benefits of defection outweigh its costs, she 
may take that path. 
C. Other Reform Possibilities 
Then there are possible approaches that do not lie within the confines of 
either of the political branches alone. One potential path is greater use of “de-
tailees,” government employees who are temporarily assigned to a position 
different from the one for which they were initially hired.275 Currently, the 
most frequent use of detailees is within a single branch of government.276 A 
prosecutor at Main Justice might, for example, be temporarily detailed to a 
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United States Attorney’s office. Less common are inter-branch details; those 
that do exist are most likely to be “from the legislature (and sometimes the 
courts) to the executive—and rarely the other way around.”277 This means that 
legislative branch employees, such as congressional committee staff, will fre-
quently have the opportunity to serve in the executive branch, whereas execu-
tive branch employees are less likely to have the same opportunity to develop 
an appreciation for the institutional interests of Congress.278 
Increasing the number of executive branch employees detailed to Con-
gress and vice versa could yield benefits. Through spending time within a dif-
ferent institution, detailed employees acquire a better understanding of—and 
perhaps even internalize—that institution’s norms, culture, and objectives.279 
Based on this aspect of human nature, some scholars have called for use of 
specific details—such as detailing OLC lawyers to the State Department’s Of-
fice of the Legal Advisor to provide them with a different perspective on the 
role of international law, or to a position outside of the executive branch to 
temper their loyalty to the power of the President.280 An OLC attorney detailed 
for a time to a legislative committee might develop a different perspective on 
the competing constitutional interests surrounding congressional access to ex-
ecutive branch information.281 Or perhaps experience working in the legisla-
tive branch should be considered a highly desirable bullet point on the resume 
of an applicant to OLC.282 
Finally, there are the courts. There are those who argue that the judiciary 
should play a larger role in resolving congressional-executive disputes.283 Re-
sort to the courts should remain one mechanism available to resolve such dis-
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putes.284 Judicial intervention cannot be, however, the only answer. As an ini-
tial matter, the courts do not want the job. Courts have been reluctant to issue 
definitive decisions in congressional-executive conflicts.285 In addition, the 
ability to go to courts is itself a function of the political state of play. Individu-
al members likely lack standing to seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas.286 
To bring such a suit, a congressional committee must authorize it. This requires 
the majority of a committee to vote in favor of such a suit. That vote, in turn, 
hinges on the individual legislators’ belief that public opinion supports aggres-
sive congressional enforcement action. And, of course, it is my contention that 
OLC’s memoranda and Congress’s lack of analogous materials influence the 
state of public opinion. So, although judicial enforcement may be a fruitful 
path for a congressional investigation with substantial political support, it is no 
remedy for the imbalance in public opinion that OLC memoranda create. 
Moreover, Congress does not seem to want to give the courts this job. In 
the wake of each major battle between the branches, reforms have been pro-
posed to ease Congress’s way into judicial enforcement of subpoenas, but 
Congress has always declined to pass those bills.287 In addition, in many in-
stances, even a judicial resolution will not provide a satisfactory conflict-
resolution mechanism. If Congress sues a presidential advisor to enforce a leg-
islative subpoena, a judicial rejection of the advisor’s claim of absolute im-
munity will not end the conflict. That advisor may be required to testify, but in 
that testimony she may assert executive privilege on the President’s behalf 
over certain information. If Congress does not agree that the material is privi-
leged, it would have to return to court to litigate the applicability of the privi-
lege. Moreover, judicial decisions regarding such questions are sufficiently 
fact-specific—based on the subject of the communication, who was involved 
in the communication, whether any subsequent acts waived the privilege, 
whether a particular congressional purpose outweighs the President’s need for 
confidentiality, et cetera—that a resolution of one case might not be particular-
ly helpful in resolving subsequent conflicts. Former National Security Advisor 
John Bolton argued during the House Intelligence Committee’s impeachment 
investigation, for example, that any judicial decision regarding whether former 
White House Counsel Don McGahn was required to honor a congressional 
subpoena would not be binding on Bolton, because McGahn’s case did not 
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address the question in the context of national security information.288 So alt-
hough judicial resolution should remain an option for enforcement of congres-
sional subpoenas, it cannot be enough alone. 
CONCLUSION 
President Trump’s extreme and unprecedented rejection of Congress’s 
powers to oversee executive branch activities has raised a host of novel ques-
tions, both political and legal. Yet President Trump’s anomalous positions and 
the resulting outcry emphasize the outsize role that OLC memoranda usually 
play. The vigorous debates of today concern the unprecedented executive re-
fusal to accommodate congressional needs. Meanwhile, longstanding OLC 
positions, such as the non-prosecution of executive branch recipients of con-
gressional contempt citations, are taken as given. The Trump presidency has 
already prompted multiple calls for rethinking the mechanics of executive 
oversight.289 The role of OLC opinions and their impact on the effectiveness of 
legislative oversight should form part of this conversation. 
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